Russia-Ukraine Flash Report 19 OCT 2023 - 15:15 PDT - Ukrainian Forces Expand on the Left Bank of the Dnipro (Patreon)

Ukrainian forces have crossed the Dnipro and Konka Rivers and entered the settlement of Krynyk. We noted in yesterday's SITREP the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine revealed that their forces had crossed the Dnipro and Konka, and now the Russian Ministry of Defense has reported the same in their morning report. The smaller Konka River, essentially a parallel tributary of the Dnipro, is a significant demarcation line as anything left (east) of the Konka is truly occupied Kherson and not the islands, which have been gray zones for months.

There is still a lot we don't know, including force size, composition, and mission.

In our assessment, the island areas north of the Konka where these incursions have occurred are likely under full military control of Ukrainian forces. We're also seeing strong indications that the Royal Marines of Great Britain, which conducted a six-month training program for approximately 1,000 Ukrainians, was highly effective. This is supportive of our earlier assessments that Ukraine needs to commit to longer training programs, and NATO trainers need to work more closely with their Ukrainian counterparts. For the latter, there are signs that it is starting to happen.

What we do know is that Russia appears to have further increased its use of glide bombs on Free Kherson, which didn't seem possible, and is relentlessly targeting civilian areas and infrastructure. For now, it appears that there are very few Russian ground troops in these regions, with Russian defense relying on drone-coordinated artillery, airstrikes, and drone-delivered IEDs.

The reports of a lack of a Russian rapid response force, a well-equipped reserve ready to stop smaller incursions that are typically VDV, Spetnzaz, or Naval Infantry, appear to be true. We continue to see in other videos very low accuracy from Russian artillery. It is possible, even likely, that worn-out systems have been transferred to this region, and artillery with better barrels have been moved to more critical AOs. We are also learning that four months after the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam, Russian forces made minimal efforts to restore their destroyed defensive positions. There is little evidence that areas were remined.

The Russian decision to pull the 810th Naval Infantry and deploy what was the intended RDF to the FLOT at Orikhiv wasn't sound. Additionally, the 810th is combat destroyed and, after a brief rotation away from the Orikhiv AO, was redeployed despite remaining in a combat-destroyed state. Most of the Russian forces immediately on the left bank are PMCs, BARS, and territorial guard units. Ukrainian Naval Infantry and Special Operation Forces have shown a high degree of training, discipline, and success.

Is this reconnaissance for a larger amphibious crossing? That's the real question.

Russian forces hold air supremacy to the banks of the Dnipro River. We remain extremely skeptical that this is preparation for a larger amphibious crossing to bring armored assets or mobility to the left bank at a battalion or brigade level - without an answer to Russian air power. Is ATACMS the answer? No. Because ATACMS can't reach the bases where Russian aircraft dropping UMPK glide bombs fly out of. The only answer here is F-16s, and that is still 6 to 12 months away.

The size and scope of the action in our assessment are not enough to force Russian commanders to commit reserves into the AO, which would hobble their ongoing counteroffensive in the Orikhiv salient, which is not going well, to begin with. The bigger question is, will Ukraine continue to expand its light infantry presence, or will they return to the islands in the coming days? Even if we knew, we couldn't tell you - OPSEC.

While Ukraine has made other incursions to the right bank of the Konka River and DRG units have made brief incursions to the left bank, this is different. We're seeing advances as deep as 11 kilometers uncontested by Russian ground troops. The hardest part right now is getting across the river and finding an answer to the VKS. Closing thought: we had warned in April 2023 that the introduction of Russian glide bombs would have a growing impact on Ukrainian offensive operations, which is why we've pushed so hard for the development of the Ukrainian Air Force.