Russia-Ukraine Flash Report for 4-19-22 15:00 PDT - Russian Military is in Trouble (Patreon)

If the latest Pentagon assessment is correct, Russian ground forces in Ukraine are in serious trouble. Today, a defense official reported that Russia had lost 25% of its combat power assigned to Ukraine since the invasion started on February 24.

Combat power is not measured simply by counting soldiers, tanks, artillery pieces, and other equipment. Military hardware, air dominance and superiority, and highly trained soldiers such as Spetsnaz are force multipliers. Conversely, forced conscription of Ukrainians followed by psychological operation units to shoot those retreating and deserting, running filtration camps, and using resources to attack non-military targets diminish force power. When the Pentagon says Russia has lost 25% of its combat power, it is purposely vague and nuanced. 

For our new Patreons (welcome!). a military unit is considered "combat ineffective" when it has lost 30% to 49% of its force. A military unit is considered "destroyed" when it has lost 50% or more of its strength.

A combat-ineffective unit can't effectively participate in or launch offensive operations. The keyword is "effectively." They can be pushed into offensive operations but will have too many gaps in personnel and equipment to perform competently. Combat-ineffective units can hold defensive lines, occupy territory already controlled, or help protect supply lines as they move from the line of contact to reconstitute and resupply.

An excellent example of how combat-ineffective units are still highly effective defenders was in the Arden during the Battle of the Bulge. Outnumbered, outgunned, and suffering from significant losses, Allied units held Bastogne until combat-effective units from the US Third Army, aided by the force multiplier of improved weather and air cover, could relieve them. The Axis offensive collapsed because a lack of supplies, particularly fuel, turned combat effective units into functionally destroyed.

What happens if a modern army loses 30% of its combat power? The same thing. An army with 30% to 49% losses is combat-ineffective. It has too many gaps to achieve strategic goals for offensive operations. An army with more than 50% losses is functionally destroyed.

We estimated Russia had lost up to 25% of its entire active main battle tank force in our April 5 Situation Report. Those losses aren't limited to Ukraine - the whole Russian military. Armor is just one component of combat power. In certain situations in Ukraine, tanks have not been a force multiplier. In urban settings without ground infantry support, they're a liability.

We directly consult with a retired Air Force Colonel, a war college graduate, and a Gulf War I and II veteran. I write that because we as a team are cautious in playing armchair general - it is a slippery slope when fact-checking war reports morphs into analyzing what those data points mean. We can assess and express opinions, but those assessments and opinions are informed by subject matter experts.

We have maintained since April 5 that Russia lacks the resources to take and maintain control of the Donbas and the Crimea landbridge. They can overrun Ukrainian forces, they could potentially encircle the salient southeast of Izyum, but they are incapable of holding the territorial gains.

If the Russian military in Ukraine has lost 25% of its combat power and Pentagon assessments have consistently been optimistic, there is no margin for error in the upcoming offensive push.

The Pentagon is reporting that Russia appears to have learned from some mistakes. They are positioning supplies closer to the line of contact, defending lines of communication better, and setting up multiple routes where possible. They are using more air cover to escort advances, particularly helicopters (Russia has lost over 10% of its Ra-52 Alligator attack helicopters).

However, Russian convoys continue to move in tight formations, maintain travel on improved and paved roads versus moving overland, and armor is misused in urban combat settings. Armor continues to be deployed with insufficient supporting infantry. Russians are doing reconnaissance in force advances and can partially occupy settlements but don't move up additional forces to hold gains. Finally, Russian OPSEC continues to be non-existent. 

The deliberate targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure using MLRS, SRBM, and Kalibr cruise missiles is, bluntly put, a waste of military resources. The era of carpet-bombing civilians by aircraft was born during the Spanish Civil War in April 1937. History has shown that the only way to break the civilian population's will through bombardment is to wipe the city and its people from the map.

If Russian combat-effectiveness drops to 70%, they won't be capable of carrying out a multi-axes offensive and holding captured territory. Not without further committing the remaining 40 to 45 combat-ready BTGs available.

Internally, the Russian industrial base is a shadow of what it was during the Soviet era. Even without sanctions, they couldn't keep up with the rate of loss and consumption for critical military hardware such as tanks, APCs, aircraft, missiles, and precision-guided munitions.

Ukraine's longer-term problem will be staffing as long as Western Allies continue to supply lethal weapons and ammunition. The entire Russian military is on the brink of irrecoverable losses that will cripple their capabilities for 10 to 20 years.