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[PATRONS]

With the shots heard round the world, how would Austro-Hungarian statesmen react to the news that the heir to their throne had been murdered in Sarajevo? In fact, as we see here, Austrian patience towards Serbia had been so exhausted by 1914 that a violent, warlike response was virtually inevitable. At least, Habsburg Foreign Minister Count Berchtold thought so. But what about the Hungarian element in the room?

Since the Compomise of 1867, Austria and Hungary had essentially become two cooperating entities, rather than an Austrian whole, so Hungarian approval from the Hungarian Premier would be necessary if any military policy was pursued. Berchtold would have to use all his skills of persuasion, but he would also call upon Emperor Franz Josef, and above all the Germans, to add greater pressure. Could he succeed? Austria's existence, Berchtold believed, hung in the balance.

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Ian

Sorry for the late comment, Dr. Twamley, only recently I could afford a Patreon membership. One underrated factor in the Sarajevo assassination is that Franz Ferdinand was basically co-emperor by this point. For better or for worse, he was a considerably more formidable character than his unfortunate cousin Rudolf, and he had long since forced his uncle to give him a role in government, even before Franz Josef was an octogenerian in the 1910s. The point is: whether he was popular or not in Viennese court society was not relevant. His death was going to bring the hammer down in some way or another, and I'd argue this is what Apis wanted all along-they'd attempted to assassinate Franz Josef himself only a few years earlier. I'm not convinced by Otte's argument that Apis confused Franz Ferdinand for a member of the war party (unlike the Okhrana operatives in Belgrade, who I do think genuinely believed it, and may have been lied to by their Serbian intel counterparts about it), because more Serbs lived over the border in the Dual Monarchy than in Serbia itself. The dynamics of who espoused what positions in Vienna may have been opaque enough to outsiders for them to confuse Franz Ferdinand as a member of the war party, but it wouldn't have been to Apis, or anybody else in Belgrade whose job it was to be in contact with terrorist cells in Austria-Hungary. That was his job. There was one figure that did want a continent wide war before the summer even started: Apis. It was the only kind of war with bigger powers that Serbia stood a chance in. And given that Serbia had been summarily dumped by the Russians more than once in its history, it isn't inconceivable that he was willing to lie to his allies when it suited him. There's never such a thing as a 100% friendly foreign intelligence service, then or now! Also, on the Austro-Hungarian side: their intelligence service was in a state of utter disgrace after the Redl affair the previous year. That probably explains a big part of why Franz Ferdinand was not inclined to take any warnings from them seriously. Up until 1914, they were still coming to terms with how much the Russians had from him, which meant that Austro-Hungarian mobilization details in Galicia were in a state of flux.