Russia-Ukraine Flash Report 15 JUN 2023 14:05 PDT - It's About Soledar (Patreon)

Ukrainian sources have reported fighting in the Rozdolivka area for the last three days, and Russian and Ukrainian sources have been reporting fighting near Vesele (the one northeast of Soledar) for about two weeks. Ukraine retook the high ground between Vesele and Yakovlivka in a positional battle at the start of the fighting. A small but tactically important advance and Russia has been trying to take those positions back. [Figure 1]

Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Defense Hanna Maliar reported that Ukrainian forces had made gains up to a kilometer in the Berkhivka-Yahdine direction and had gone on the offensive from Rozodlivka to Vesele. Russian sources have reported fighting within Berkhivka for over a week, and our own intelligence has the village as a gray area. Neither combatant has a firm hold on the settlement. Ukrainian forces are between 500 to 1000 meters from the M-03 Highway and the administrative border of Paraskoviivka, which is a critical logistics node and Russian forward operating base previously established by PMC Wagner near the hospital. Yevgeny Prigozhin had recorded numerous videos from the hospital roof in Paraskoviivka. [Figure 2]

It's becoming clearer that Ukraine's strategy is to break the northern flank of Bakhmut by unrolling the Russian advances in a reverse sequence. This is logical, considering how critical terrain remains in modern warfare. The Russian capture of Soledar was cemented with the capture of Yakovlivka coupled with the advances from Pokrovske.

Russia's hold on Dubovo-Vasylivka is more tenuous than our current map reflects, with the line of conflict blurred. It is very likely that Ukrainian forces have advanced further north from the Berkhivkske Reservoir, but no pictures or videos to geolocate, no map change. With Ukrainian forces on three sides and the M-03 Highway Russian GLOC under Ukrainian fire control, the Russian garrison in the village doesn't have many options. When Ukraine establishes control of the ridges to the south of the village and to the west, the Russian troops will be in a technical encirclement, and another "withdrawal to more strategically advantageous positions" will occur. [Figure 3]

What would that look like? The first thing that happens is just as Ukraine's position in Zaliznyanske became untenable once Dubovo-Vasylivka was taken, it will be untenable for Russia once they are forced to leave Dubovo-Vasylivka. That brings Ukrainian forces back to the length of the M-03 Highway, and then Blahodatne (the one north of Paraskoviivka) will likely be the next point Ukraine would try to advance to - once again - unrolling the Russian offensive village by village. [Figure 4]

It is important to note that Ukraine is doing this without adding significant additional forces in the Bakhmut-Soledar Operational Area. The arrival of the Ukrainian 80th Brigade, now fighting the Russian 80th Brigade, was part of a rotation and is operating in the Klishchiivka Operational Area. 

Is this part of the "big" counteroffensive? 

Like the other operations in the Lyubymivka-Staromlynivka Operational Direction and the Orikhiv Operational Area, these attacks are somewhere between shaping operations and subordinate efforts to the main attack that has not started.

Ukraine's strategy in Bakhmut has become clearer. Physically capture the M-03 Highway to Paraskoviivka and retake the northern part of Yakovlivka to cut the T-1302 Highway. Capture Blahodatne, and retake the garden center between Paraskoviivka, Pidhorodne, and Krasna Hora. This physically cuts off the northern route into Bakhmut, which is already challenging for Russia to use. This is subordinate activity that will force Russia to either face the prospect of losing Soledar in the fall or moving more reserve forces to the Operational Area.

What can Russia do? 

• Commit reserve forces and assets to stabilize the flank, but this won't solve the problem of Dubovo-Vasylivka without launching offensive operations. With many of their reserve forces already forward deployed on the main line of defense in Zaporizhia, any commitment will either weaken their positions in another part of Ukraine or make the existing defensive line more shallow.
• Reallocate resources from the southern flank around Klishchiivka to Soledar, but as it stands, Russian forces are struggling to hold the current lines.
• Withdraw from Zaliznyanske and Dubovo-Vasylivka and consolidate those forces on the remaining high ground north of Berkhivka to defend Paraskoviivka and the T-513 Highway GLOC into Bakhmut. Both combatants have shown they are adept at retrograde operations.
• A combination of the above.
• Admit that Bakhmut was unimportant, withdraw and reallocate forces to other critical areas of the front and stabilize the situation on the best available defense line. In that scenario, the Bakhmutkova River would be the most logical defensive point.
• Ignore the problem and continue to report great victory. "We will not be wedged!"
• Something else we haven't considered or something unthinkable such as CBRN.

History has shown that a retrograde operation or continuing to claim great victory until you can't anymore have been the Russian go-to strategy. However, it is very important to note that Russia is demonstrating they have learned from over a year of mistakes.

Is Bakhmut-Soledar strategically important for Ukraine?

Yes and no. On its own, no, nothing has changed about the unimportance of Bakhmut and Soledar in the short term in a strategic sense. Every square meter of occupied territory is important in the macro. As we had assessed since October of 2022, Russia would do everything it could short of CBRN to capture Bakhmut and, once completed, would have no more combat potential to turn operational success into tactical or strategic victories.

PMC Wagner destroyed itself both in terms of combat potential and political clout, capturing Bakhmut and Soledar, and it is worth noting PMC Wagner never brought Bakhmut to full military control. Admittedly holding on to a sliver of Litak and the last alleyway of the city is a pedantic point. There has never been a picture or video of PMC Wagner or Russian forces walking around the Tchaikovsky and Korsunskogo Street triangle, west of Ivana Ivkina, at Litak, or more than one block south of Yulytsya Street north of Bulavina Avenue. Since June 1, the videos released by Russian state media, Russian unaffiliated war correspondents and propagandists, and the so-called Donetsk People's Republic, where they can drive and walk around with impunity, have been west of the railroad tracks in an area we consider a "green zone" for Russian troops. [Figure 5]

However, in the medium and long term, in a timeline where the Ukrainian counteroffensive fails, Western aid falters because of the failure and shifts in the United States' political structure, and Ukrainian combat potential is exhausted, the northern flank of Bakhmut does become a launching point toward Slovyansk, and cutting off Ukrainian troops in the Siversk Operational Area. That is a lot of "ifs." Even in that scenario, Russia will still need fresh, motivated forces that are well-equipped to start a new advance from Bakhmut.

This is an operation that you should be watching closely.