Russia-Ukraine Flash Report 30 JAN 2023 09:15 PST - Is Ukraine Losing? (Patreon)

The front appears frozen, Ukraine can't break through Kreminna, Russia captured Soledar and is creeping through the forests and fields south of Bakhmut. They're attacking Zaporizhia and Vuhledar, and Denis Pushilin keeps saying that Marinka will be captured tomorrow, tomorrow, tomorrow. Is Ukraine losing?

When I'm asked this question, I always respond the same way.

"Define, win."

It's been 81 days since Ukraine liberated the west bank of the Dnipro.

It's been 127 days since Ukraine liberated Lyman.

It's been 141 days since Ukraine liberated Izyum and 95% of Russian-controlled Kharkiv with it. Russia now holds 1.3%.

It's been 311 days since Russia held the maximum area of control of Ukrainian territory - 43%ish - today, they hold about 19%, and over 1/3 of that was held before February 24, 2022.

If the expectation is that Ukraine should liberate 1/8 of the remaining Russian-controlled areas every 75 days, that is simply unrealistic.

There has been a flood of disinformation/misinformation from the Russian information space as part of Valery Gerasimov's doctrine of hybrid warfare ever since he was named the commander of the forces in Ukraine. Candidly, we're mentally exhausted by it, and we are practiced in spotting Russian disinformation. Russia's hybrid warfare policy is powerful, but the truth matters.

There has been a lot of digital ink spilled about a pending large Russian counteroffensive ranging from the intent to capture the Donbas to capturing all of Ukraine.

Full stop.

Capturing Ukraine and preventing an insurgence will require 1.6 million Russian troops to pacify 32 million people rotating constantly during a long-term occupation. That doesn't include rebuilding and administration and the related costs. We made that analysis in March 2022 and stand by it today. At best, Russia has 350,000 forces, including Kadyrovites, the LNR and DNR armies, Wagner PMC, and a handful of much smaller mercenary and volunteer organizations in Ukraine right now. Most of them are poorly trained, using older equipment, and are there because they were conscripted or mobilized. They are very poorly led and have no training in civil administration or security - a completely different set of requirements from a combat soldier.

Yes, but Russia has up to 200,000 more that have been trained for three to five months. They will be so much better! Have we already forgotten that Russia invaded Ukraine with 190,000 soldiers, and up to two-thirds of them were professional soldiers with combat experience in Syria and Chechnya? They were armed with the best equipment, had unlimited artillery support, and the Russian VKS provided extensive close air support. Ukraine was largely on its own during those first 30 days of the war. How did that work out? We've learned that Sumy, which was on the brink of a technical encirclement, was largely defended by citizen soldiers told, "here are some guns, good luck."

Russia is incapable of capturing all of Ukraine because they don't have the military resources to do it. The country has an inadequate force, even under Shoigu's current plan to expand the regular military to 1.5 million members by 2026. Russia doesn't need an army of 1.6 million to pacify Ukraine, it needs a much larger one because it has other defense issues, CSTO and Syrian obligations, and internal security, and it has to rotate those troops in Ukraine. They can't stay indefinitely. Russia can't staff, equip, train, and pay for a military that large even if sanctions ended 100% tomorrow.

So breathe - Russia is incapable of capturing Ukraine even if it expended all of its resources just on Ukraine.

Let's go around the axes.

Luhansk: Russia has built up an exceptionally large force, including VDV, Spetnaz, and Naval Infantry around Svatove and Kreminna. The 76th VDV was used as a defensive force in Izyum and northwest of Kherson at Davydiv Brid. The Wagner Line, which was built in the fall, does not extend to Severodonetsk. It stops just south of Svatove - and east of the town. If Ukraine breaks through at Kreminna, Ukraine will be behind the Wagner Line, making the fortification pointless. Ukrainian forces do not attack strongholds head-on, they bypass them, and the large presence complicates that effort.

Could Russia launch a large counteroffensive here and attempt to advance back to Lyman and, ultimately, Kramatorsk and Slovyansk? Absolutely. It is also one of the most logical places to attack because, without Kramatorsk and Slovyansk, it will be nearly impossible to capture the western half of the Donbas for reasons we have repeatedly covered. But Kramatorsk and Slovyansk have defenses prepared for nine years with extensive Ground Lines of Communication (GLOC - supply line) network.

Siversk: Russian forces have not been able to capture and hold Spirne, Berestove, and Bilohorivka [Donetsk] since they reached all three settlements in mid to late May. They couldn't advance past the oil refinery, and they never achieved full military control of Bilohorivka [Luhansk] despite a massive amount of resources applied all along this axis.

Soledar/Bakhmut: On May 17, Ukrainian forces withdrew from Svitlodarsk and Luhanske and moved to the reservoir's west side. That was 258 days ago, and we assess that is the day the Soledar/Bakhmut offensive started. 

The first offensive on Soledar, a town that was once home to 10,000 people, started 188 days ago. The first direct offensive on Bakhmut? 181 days ago. It does appear that PMC Wagner destroyed itself by capturing Soledar, producing another pyrrhic victory.

But Wagner is still fighting and advancing!

That's true. And the DNR 1st Army Corps still exists, and the LNR 2nd Army Corps still exists, and Chechen Akhmat still exists. When was the last time you heard about any of these organizations playing a leading role in an offensive after the capture of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk? Have we already forgotten the Russian 3rd Army Corps was combat destroyed and liquidated after two weeks in the field?

We had assessed in the fall, largely because there was no other logical reason to justify the continued attacks, that Russia was "all-in" at Soledar/Bakhmut and would do everything it could to capture the area. When Russia threatened the world with the use of tactical nuclear weapons, analysts we talk to and trust told us that Bakhmut was the "no-brainer" choice if Russia used a tactical nuke because it would break the deadlock.

Russia captured Soledar by wiping it from the map. Ukraine withdrew because the only thing left to defend was 200 kilometers of holes in the ground and dust on the surface, and that's not an exaggeration based on the satellite image we shared.

The problem after Soledar/Bakhmut is Russia is running out of secondary forces it can use to offset losses on the home front. There are almost no men left to conscript and mobilize in occupied Luhansk. It is a similar situation in Donetsk. Kadyovrites are only playing a minor role, and there has been an increasing number of high-profile incidents of their forces committing atrocities against Russian occupiers. The latest one came out today, with Chechen soldiers accused of raping a Russian state media reporter.

You're not going to see North Koreans in Ukraine. We had assessed in March 2022 that Assad wouldn't release 40,000 of his own troops, 25% of his total military, to Ukraine because he needs them in Syria to maintain some degree of control. China is quite content to watch Russia destroy itself and would never intervene militarily because sanctions would be catastrophic. Russia and PMC Wagner have already attempted to recruit from African nations and have largely been rebuffed. We maintain that Lukashenko is playing the role of uncool Lando Calrissian and doing juuuuust enough to keep his troops out of active conflict while doing juuuuust enough to stay in power. Belarus' regular military is about 16,000 soldiers with 34,000 more reserves. They aren't going to get involved unless Russian forces stage a full-scale Cold War-style occupation. The 2,000ish Russian troops on vacation in Transnistria won't make one bit of a difference, and their withdrawal would allow Moldova to apply for NATO membership and make achieving European Union membership requirements easier.

OK, enough about Bakhmut and the state of the Russian military because of almost a year of fighting in the Donbas.

Donetsk to Velyka Novosilka: Our favorite FSB Colonel and convicted war criminal Igor "Girkin" Strelkov wrote the obituary for the Vuhledar offensive today, and he isn't the only Russian milblogger doing it. 

Why?

For the same reasons we have assessed since June. In May 2022, the Russian military pulled artillery and armor resources and moved troops from the DNR into Luhansk to support the siege of Severodonetsk. It ended an ongoing offensive to encircle Avdiivka and capture Marinka. When Ukraine withdrew from Lysychansk on July 3, 2022, there wasn't a 1st Army Corps left to return back to the axis, Ukraine reinforced its positions, and Russia withheld armor and artillery.

With the 1st Army Corps destroyed, Russian commanders directed the 2nd Army Corps of the LNR to fight in Donetsk. Did we forget about that? Multiple LNR units refused orders and openly asked, including commanders, why are we being sent to Donetsk when we hadn't fully secured all of Luhansk (referring to Bilohorivka and Zolotarivka).

We had the July to early August offensives at the Donetsk International Airport, Pisky, and Marinka. It took almost three months to capture Pisky, which the DNR barely clings to. Russia can't hold Vodyane, is stuck just north of the airport, and we recently learned that Ukraine quietly made advances toward Spartak. The DNR has lost thousands of lives trying to capture the firebase at Nevleske - a literal spec on the map.

Marinka is no closer to being captured than it was in May 2022.

The Vuhledar offensive has failed because the city is a fortress, and the approaches are wide open fields. The 155th Motor Infantry (formerly Naval Infantry) never captured all of Pavlivka (which was our position when the offensive ended). In a huge sign that there was a significant problem with available troops and the equipment to support them, Russian offensive operations on the Niu York, Avdiivka, and Marinka axes almost completely stopped during the attack on Vuhledar, including artillery strikes.

Why?

Because Russia's artillery capacity is increasingly equipment and ammunition restrained, firing at 25% of its peak in June 2022 and up to 40% in short bursts - such as we saw the last two weeks during pushes in Zaporizhia, southwest Donetsk and at Soledar/Bakhmut.

This isn't just our analysis. Multiple Russian milbloggers report ammunition shortages, a lack of armor support, limited close air support, unreliable military intelligence, and a lack of basic radio communications.

What about Zaporizhia?

There wasn't any real offensive there, to begin with. It was propaganda, and attacks were led by platoon-sized units that surprised Ukrainian defenses. Reinforces were quickly brought in, and things returned to the previous line of conflict, with Russia gaining in a few spots and the world learning that Ukraine was further south than previously known in a few others. Was there testing and probing here? Definitely. Don't forget, Russian milbloggers were writing panicked assessments for months that Ukraine has huge reserves in this area and was planning a massive counter-offensive.

How can we say that Ukraine still holds the initiative if the front is mostly frozen and Russia probes into multiple regions?

Which nation was forced to move a large number of troops to the northeastern side of the front to prevent a breakthrough of established defenses? All of those forces in Luhansk, which could, and very well will be used for a push to Lyman, Slovyansk, and Kramatorsk, are now 100% in the wrong place if Ukraine suddenly launched an attack in Zaporizhia. Who made who move troops in response to a perceived threat? That's called holding initiative. Ukraine wasn't "forced" to move troops to Soledar/Bakhmut because of a new threat - they were already there and fighting since May (extending to the start of the advance in Svitlodarsk).

Kherson?

Russia cannot attempt a Dnipro crossing, establish a contested bridgehead, and then mount a largescale amphibious crossing. The continuous missile attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure have turned Ukraine into one of the most air-defense-dense nations on the planet. An attempt to use airborne troops would be a catastrophe. 

Ukraine still dictates the total battlefield, and Russia is too invested in Soledar/Bakhmut to walk away like they should have in August and move those troops to the Avdiivka and Marinka axes. Those were winnable battles for Russia in the summer that would have provided a significant propaganda win and the opportunity to turn operational success into a tactical victory into a strategic win. 

There is a larger political agenda in Soledar/Bakhmut due to the ongoing Kremlin Game of Thrones. Dimming Prigozhin's political star is now a priority. Squeezing PMC Wagner until the threat of a 65,000-person army (including in Africa - people leave that number out) equipped with some of the best Russian equipment suddenly comes home with a charismatic leader with political ambitions must be crushed.

What about the claims of Russia launching a large-scale offensive soon - somewhere?

Broken clocks are eventually correct. Certainly, Russia will attempt to retake the initiative, and a lack of a real winter in Ukraine has helped Russian forces out immensely. Had the weather been closer to normal, thousands would have suffered debilitating cold weather injuries, froze to death, and sought to surrender. Writing and getting on TV to declare "Russia is preparing a massive counteroffensive" is not a revelation; it's reality.

When Russia launches its counteroffensive somewhere, it will gain territory, maybe significant amounts. But we saw in Kyiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, northern Donetsk, and western Kherson they are incapable of administering and holding those territories beyond the short term. Just as we had assessed in May 2022.

Is Ukraine suffering losses? Of course, it's war. It's Ukraine losing equipment? Of course, it's war. Is Ukraine suffering severe losses? In Soledar and Bakhmut, almost certainly. It's a war against a ruthless enemy that is using scorched earth tactics. We've known this for almost a year.

What were Russia's original objectives? Isn't that the most objective measure of who is - winning?

• Remove the government in Kyiv and replace it with a pro-Moscow one: failed
• Demilitarize Ukraine: epic fail
• Discover and end Ukraine's secret nuclear weapons program: what program?
• Discover and expose Ukraine's secret biolabs funded by the West: what labs?
• Liberate the abused Russian speakers in Ukraine: Ask the populations in Kharkiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy, which were 50/50 to majority Russian speakers, what they think
• Prevent NATO expansion: epic fail
• Take Kyiv in three days, pacify Ukraine in two weeks - the west will never intervene because they are weak: how has that worked out?
• Denazify Ukraine: Are we the baddies? We can't possibly be the baddies. Yes, you're the baddies.
• End the uni-polar world and expand Russian influence: part one - no such thing, ask China - part two - epic fail
• Reduced goal - capture the Donbas: fail
• Extended reduced goal: capture all of the Donbas plus Zaoprizhia and Kherson: even bigger fail

So breathe.

This is war. War is not linear or predictable. Ukraine is not going to win every battle. Almost a year ago, the 2nd largest military in the world, allegedly with equipment that matched or was better than NATO, invaded its geographical neighbor, the 22nd largest military in the world. Almost a year later, most of the territory held was lightly defended during the war's opening days due to unfavorable terrain. When Russian forces reached the prepared defensive lines, to quote the God-awful movie, Red Dawn, they were stopped "butt cold."

So breathe.

By my definition of win, no, Russia is not winning, and by our team's assessment, Ukraine still holds the initiative because Ukraine is still dictating the deployment of Russian troops throughout the theater. Russia appears to have bet big in Luhansk, and it's a long trip over to Kherson and Zaporizhia if Russia bets wrong.

A closing thought - remember in November when everyone was saying that a Russian offensive through Belarus was a certainty? We assessed it as a moderate possibility into January or early February and then took it off the table when we learned Russia was just rotating troops in and out of Belarus because they were receiving training there.

Russia will launch a counteroffensive somewhere, and Ukraine is much better equipped, staffed, and with vastly more support than it had in February 2022.

Breathe.