Special Assessment: Putin Will Use Nukes Redline Fallacy (Patreon)

As multiple agencies investigate the potential April 11 chemical weapons attack in Mariupol, the wails of NATO must get involved echoed across the virtual hallways of the commentariat. The talking point from pro-Russian accounts has been less about denial and more, "it's not our business, and if NATO/United States gets involved, Putin will just use nukes."

This argument is a red herring because it ignores fundamental physics, the impact of nuclear weapons, and simple meteorology.

Many share the number that Russia has "6,000 nuclear bombs," which is factual. Of those, 1,588 are deployed strategically. That is defined as already attached to a launch system or at an airbase ready to be loaded into a heavy bomber. Russia's total military stockpile is 4,477, with the remainder unusable. At best, 2,889 warheads/bombs are in storage and could be deployed after the initial 1,588 are exhausted.

Additionally, of the 4,477 warheads available, 1,912 are "non-strategic." About 500 are low yield (under 10KT). A subset of these low yield devices are not "battlefield" weapons - they are antiaircraft, antiship, and antisubmarine devices attached to torpedoes and surface-to-air or ship-to-air launchers. They're designed to sink aircraft carriers, destroy opposing nuclear submarines, or shoot down high-altitude bombers. Finally, approximately 500 of the available inventory are gravity bombs.

It is highly likely that in the event of total commitment, Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), those 2,889 reserve warheads would never get used. First, storage bunkers are an integral part of a first-strike target package in a proposed limited nuclear war.

OPINION: There is no such thing as limited nuclear war. A limited strategic first strike or escalation response would devolve into total commitment.

Second, in an exchange that committed all 1,588 available nuclear weapons, it is unlikely there would be any remaining force capable of utilizing the reserve stockpile.

Given the state of Russia's conventional forces, a limited military budget of $67 billion a year, and the failures of other weapons programs like the Su-57 fifth-generation fighter and the T-14 main battle tank, serious questions exist about the actual capabilities of Russian nuclear forces. In comparison, the United States spends $63 billion a year just on maintaining a smaller nuclear arsenal!

The Russian Ministry of Defense's declaration of possessing super torpedo wonder weapons capable of producing 500 meter high tidal waves is almost certainly overstated. Using a hypersonic missile during the Russia-Ukraine War and releasing photos of the launch, Russia revealed the design is based on an existing missile platform.  

None of this is to suggest that Russia is not a nuclear superpower or Russia doesn't have a first strike or retaliatory capability. The 6,000 warhead number is an exaggeration of actual capabilities, and it is highly probable a subset of the reserve is in an unusable state.

The full capabilities of nuclear forces are state secrets among the nine nuclear-armed nations (Russia, United States, France, United Kingdom, China, Pakistan, India, Israel, and North Korea). Published data indicates that the highest yield bombs the United States has strategically deployed are 1.2 MT, and for Russia, 800KT. 

Physics and meteorology make a strategic strike on Ukraine meant to "denazify" and prevent the destruction of Russia from the Ukrainians would result in hundreds of thousands of Russian casualties, even if NATO and the Western Allies decided that a redline wasn't crossed.

The attached map was created using the Nuke Map tool. It assumes Topol 800KT warheads are used in a strike designed to completely destroy Ukrainian military capabilities, cause maximum damage to infrastructure, and terrorize the civilian population to message other nuclear-armed nations not to get involved. It also assumes that Russia would intend to preserve Crimea and the Donbas, so areas along the southern landbridge and eastern Ukraine are not targeted.

The model assumes that the detonations are ground bursts to destroy underground infrastructure and are done during clear weather under typical prevailing winds. This creates an inescapable problem for Russia. Hundreds of thousands of people would be exposed to fallout from alpha particles in quantity to kill 25% to 50% of those exposed within 30 days. Potentially millions of people would be exposed enough to suffer from ARS and have an elevated risk for cancer, infertility, and birth defects for an entire generation.

Russia can't strike Ukraine (or the former Warsaw Pact nations) without sending lethal amounts of radiation over its own country and allied nations such as Belarus.

It is unimaginable that the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine at any level would be ignored by other nuclear powers, including China, Pakistan, and India. Even in a limited exchange that somehow didn't reach total commitment between Russia and NATO nations, China, India, and Pakistan have a vested interest in not having fallout raining down on their countries. 

If the central argument for ending involvement in Ukraine or holding the line at ammunition and defensive weapons is "because they have nukes," the reality becomes there is no redline. This becomes an endless argument against intervention.

OPINION: United States policy in the Middle East versus North Korea has established a clear message that nuclear-armed nations can get away with more. The North Korean regime is given far more latitude than Iraq or Iran with the enforcement of United States foreign policy and attitude toward nuclear weapons proliferation. We acknowledge the strategic difference with North Korea and the technical state of hostilities that exist with South Korea.

The Putin regime's current global situation and doctrine indicate that the globe is falling deeper into the Mutually Assured Destruction Instability Paradox. MAD has worked since the 1950s on the assumption that a nuclear-armed nation would not use its capabilities as a shield to commit conventional war and atrocities at will. After seven weeks of warfare in Ukraine, it is clear that Russia is doing just that and has made apparent displays to the world that they have nuclear weapons and aren't afraid to use them. Hence the paradox - you won't attempt to destroy me because I will destroy you - but because I can destroy you, I will do whatever I want because you'll never respond.

Suppose Russian President Vladimir Putin is genuinely committed to the concept of limited nuclear war for national survival for what is a non-existent threat. In that case, non-involvement signals that Russia can do what it wants because it is nuclear-armed.

Watching the response to the possible chemical weapons attack in Mariupol, In our assessment, the wails of "but he has nukes" appear to be a Kremlin-based talking point in some circles, encouraging isolationism. That message appeals to a broad demographic because a rational person doesn't want to chance a nuclear exchange.

President Putin is not behaving rationally, and if Western Allies elect potentially equally irrational leaders over the next two to four years, the MAD Instability Paradox worsens.

In Washington D.C., a bipartisan group of politicians and intelligence and military officials warned that Russia was actively working to restore the former Soviet Union as far back as 2015.

How NATO can become further involved is a question best answered by the leaders of NATO and the Western Allies aligned with them. You can build a credible argument that World War III started a decade ago and moved to include kinetic warfare in 2022.

 As long as NATO takes the position of "but they have nuclear weapons," no redline exists.

If no redline exists, Russia will systematically destroy Ukraine regardless of cost. If the strategy is to sacrifice a nation of 42 million people to grind Russia's conventional forces to a pulp, an unstable leader with visions of former glory is only left with his nuclear detente.