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這些年來,曾不斷介紹國際關係詞彙「軟實力」(soft power),由美國民主基金會(National Endowment for Democracy)「改良」成專為中國、俄羅斯而設的新名詞「銳實力」(Sharp power)。及後正牌「軟實力之父」奈爾(Joseph Nye)也在多個媒體撰文回應,除了簡單闡述這些概念外,特別提到發揮「銳實力」的各種手段,其實美國、蘇聯在冷戰時代都曾使用,所以「銳實力論」只是新瓶舊酒。然而這些「舊酒」的套路,也依然值得閱讀。

正如民主基金會所說,「銳實力」是指威權政體利用民主國家的民主、自由環境,通過自身政治、經濟影響力,利用各種如媒體、文化交流等手法,去約制、操控當地輿論。換句話說,這是威權國家使用各種表面為「軟實力」的工具,去影響輿論,並達到政治目的,所以「銳實力」也是「軟實力」的一種,只是名字負面而已。

但與此同時,正如奈爾在《外交事務》撰文,「銳實力」每每為敵對目的、欺騙性地使用訊息,背後必須有力量加持,所以實際上也是「硬實力」的一種;他亦提及如電台等「軟實力」工具,是否被看待成「銳實力」,也是一線之差,視乎背後操作、目的而定。從這角度看,冷戰期間,「銳實力外交」早已是美國國策。

二戰結束後,以蘇聯為首的共產勢力有西擴跡象。美國面對共產主義勢力的擴散,尋求新外交方針,外交官凱南(George Kennan)的「圍堵政策」(Containment)就應運而生。根據凱南對二戰後局勢的解讀,美國與蘇聯角力,並非軍事實力的對碰,而是一種長遠的政治戰。當然,這不意味美國放棄與蘇聯在軍事力量的對抗,美蘇隨後多場的代理人戰爭、軍備競賽便是例子之一。凱南的主張是在「硬實力」以外,於政治層面與蘇聯競爭。中央情報局(CIA)、自由歐洲國家委員會(National Committee for Free Europe)等,就是在這些背景下成立。

最具體的「銳實力」式例子,包括美國戰後對希臘、土耳其政治的介入。戰後希臘陷入內戰,英國支持希臘王國,對抗南斯拉夫、保加利亞與阿爾巴尼亞支持的國民軍、左翼勢力。1947年,二戰後勢力大不如前的英國向美國表示,已無力在經濟上支持希臘,需要美國接手。根據學者卡斯美維斯(Christos Kassimeris)研究,美國除了在財政、軍事上的援助外,CIA還與當地情報機構合作,執行大量政治監控活動,而這種較為「輕量」的支持,是為美國在希臘內戰的基本原則,以免希臘通過民主程序,落入蘇聯陣營。

美國對戰後土耳其的支持,亦與「希臘模式」近似,並不單強調軍事支持,而是在財政、物資上的支援。例如幫助土耳其興建全天候公路,一方面對調動軍力有幫助,另一方面對農業亦有正面作用,演繹出來的官方論述,就成了「美國幫助土耳其復興國家經濟」。由此可見,美國成為「世界警察」,與承接大英帝國的海外影響力關係密切。但二戰後,不可能以老牌殖民主義方式執行,便改以一種成本較低、更為有效,集中於政治戰的模式,以抗衡蘇聯為首的共產主義陣營。

(待續)

*改編自沈旭暉《信報財經新聞》文章

▶️ 中美脫鉤與香港:中國Sharp Power的反面教材
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eUW7ni6sptk

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Comments

George

In my observation, the phenomenon of declining US power, be it hard, soft, or sharp, in recent years is due in large to the rise of progressive ideologies. Global progressive movements have long sought to refashion the world's values and views in the interests of minority or specific groups. As these movements gain momentum across the west, they are often driven in the name of minority rights, equality, social justice, and political correctness to an extent that seriously distorts the original aims. Their toxic forms, including cancel culture and an arbitrary extension of 'white sins' in colonialism and imperialism to other issues, have become an outgrowth of a much broader philosophy. This philosophy views merit and prosperity as proof of guilt. As a result, rogue regimes are thrilled to have been given free rein to erode our democratic systems, thereby chipping away at the values and credibility of Western democracies. In particular, the influence of US hegemony—hard power, soft power, as well as sharp power—can no longer be effectively exerted as much as during the era of the Cold War. Progressivism could potentially impact U.S. hegemony in several ways. First, it may shift foreign policy priorities, prioritizing domestic concerns and social issues over projecting military power and maintaining global dominance. This shift in domestic policy can divert attention and resources away from maintaining and asserting U.S. hegemony on the global stage. Second, progressivism often promotes multilateral approaches and cooperation with other nations. While this approach is necessary when dealing with superpower-like rivals such as Russia and mainland China, it can lead to the dilution of U.S. unilateral power and decision-making authority, as well as more restrictions on handling global issues that are relevant to U.S. interests. In addition, progressive ideologies often question and challenge U.S. military interventions and assertiveness in foreign affairs. This skepticism towards interventionism can result in a more cautious approach to projecting U.S. power and influence. Last but not least, progressivism tends to emphasize soft power, including diplomacy, dialogue, and tools like cultural influence and humanitarian aid. While soft power is important, it may not be as effective in maintaining hegemonic dominance as traditional hard power elements like military strength and economic leverage, especially when rivals do not play by the same rules.

堅離地書院 College

But progressive ideologies were even stronger in the 60s-70s. US maintained the same superpower status despite all that.