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“War.” The professor paced in front of the class. He was built like a soldier, his robes clearly modified to let him run and fight at a moment’s notice, and he carried a sword strapped to his waist.

In a twist, the class was held in one of the stadiums, not in a classroom, and the uniform for the class was the exercise outfits, not the typical poofy robes that were required everywhere else. Mormerilhawn, the Black Rose, master of the arena, was lurking near the sidelines, chatting with Shirayuki. I could eavesdrop on their conversation, but then I wouldn’t be focusing on the first lecture of the War class. “It is a word that encompasses so much, and is boiled down to such a little word. War. What is a war? Anyone.” He asked the moderately-sized class.

A few hands hesitantly went up, and one confident hand.

I kept my hands down. I didn’t know for sure, and venturing a poor guess would just waste everyone’s time.

The professor seemed to think the same thing, and immediately pointed at the student. He stood up and recited.

“War is simply a continuation of politics by violent means.” He sat down after finishing his answer.

The professor nodded.

“Good. Eloquently put. There is always an objective to war, and while you’ll rarely be in a position to know what it is, attempting to divine it is useful. The objective can be dumb. Sometimes it is as petty as pride, or a desire to show off. This class, like a war, will be ugly and brutal. I’m not going to mince words. I’m not going to try and pretend war is noble and glorious. Those of you who believe that have been lied to.” The professor continued to energetically pace in front of us like a caged tiger.

“The master of the arena has graciously agreed to assist with our class today, and will be assisting sporadically. All of you have gotten shielded. Nobody here is at risk of being harmed. I am planning on a practical demonstration later.” He announced.

The fact that he was telling us this ahead of time told me that the ‘practical demonstration’ was going to be a surprise. I started to evaluate the students around me.

“There are a dozen different types of war, which I’ll get into in a minute. Fundamentally, nearly every war, by the numbers, is economic. It’s about amassing wealth and power for those directing the war. These are the least devastating on a large scale, and also the most common. I call these ‘raider’s wars’.” He paused, like he expected the vast swaths of angry mutterings from his students.

“Yes, that’s what most ‘wars’ are.” He continued on. “One noble doesn’t like another. They get a party together and raid the territory of the other. They’ll try to seize gems and goods, with the larger prize being capturing another noble and ransoming them back to their family. This can happen from small levels to a national scale, when an entire country ‘wages war’ on another country. In reality, the people there are simply trying to obtain wealth, in one form or another. Capturing and settling new land, a permanent source of wealth, is another, larger goal. Occasionally this is broken out into wars of conquest. End of the day, they’re all the same. Raider’s wars.”

The angry mutterings were reaching a crescendo.

“Homework! For bonus points. Write an essay explaining why I’m wrong. Moving on.” The professor had neatly and skillfully decapitated the brewing mutiny among his students.

“Knowing the motivation is important. If you’re against raiders, they’re in it for the money. Make it too expensive for them to continue, and they’ll generally cut their losses and return home. Can’t bribe them, they’ll keep extorting you for more. Need to hit them in the pocketbook for them to go home.”

The mutterings were back, and he held up a hand.

“With that being said, I will acknowledge that pride and ego often come into play here. Attackers are willing to keep going, on the chance that they’ll end up making a profit, and because whoever’s in charge can’t retreat for various political and personal reasons once the attack’s commenced. It takes a significant kick to the teeth for them to retreat with nothing, but once it’s too expensive to keep going, and they get a minor win with which they can claim victory, then you can count on them leaving.”

A hand shot up, the same as before. The professor eyed the student doubtfully, but then called on him.

“What’s your number?” The professor asked the student. The student with his hand up in the air pointed at himself.

“Me? Number?” He asked.

The professor nodded.

“How many intelligent beings have you killed in a team or army? Monsters don’t count.”

The student paused a moment.

“23.” He answered.

“Alright Mr. 23. What’s your question?”

“Will they still leave if it’s a war of conquest like you said, where the goal is land?”

The professor sighed.

“Less likely, and that’s where it gets… messy. And by messy, I mean a lot of blood, screaming, and stacked bodies. Let’s continue on. One aspect to raider’s wars which is particularly nasty to handle is when the people making the money are the arms suppliers. People who are making their money and wealth selling weapons, armor, and expertise to those actually waging the war. They’re getting paid either way, and have every incentive to keep the war going.”

The professor continued to pace, and I was fascinated. He had a presence, an energy, that was captivating.

“Next up is what I’m broadly defining as an ideological war. The gods are only involved in a fraction of ideological wars, but fundamentally, they’re all the same. The attacker has a deep-seated belief that the defender must die. Rarely, the goal will be for something other than killing off another group. These are harder to deflect, and correspondingly rarer. It also segues nicely into my next type of war. Total war.”

He stopped, and looked at us all.

“Total war is what most people think of when they hear war. It is a war for survival. It is a do or die war. One country’s ideological war is another country’s total war. When a country believes it is in total war, all the rules are gone. There is no Treaty of Kyowa. There are no rules of engagement. There is no proper treatment of prisoners. It is why I have such respect for Nime.”

The students were talking loudly amongst each other, and the professor silenced us all with a gesture. It didn’t stop the students, of course, he simply used some Sound magic to mute them.

“Nime understands these principles better than anyone else. They cultivate Poison, Miasma, and Spore classers. Anyone attacking them knows that they’re not going to respect the so-called ‘rules’ of war, and will unleash anything and everything they can simply to survive. Every attack on Nime is an assault on the small nation’s very survival. They know how to properly threaten others. It is why nobody raids Nime. The cost to wage a raider’s war on the nation is too high, most of the attackers will get killed. An ideological war is likely brewing, as they are routinely condemned for openly violating Kyowa, but nobody acts on it. Nobody is harmed enough to do something about it. The nation is poor, and the cost-benefit analysis is always negative.”

I saw his point. “I might die, but I’m taking you down with me.” Was one hell of a deterrent.

“I want you all to spend a few moments thinking of conflicts you’ve heard of, and seeing if you can categorize them.” The professor said. “Then we’ll move onto the next section.”

I thought of the Formorian war. That had been a total war, Remus’s very existence hanging on the outcome. They were monsters. They didn’t want wealth or land, they simply wanted to consume.

From their point of view, it was probably a… raider’s war? They ignored the dwarves, who were too tough a nut to crack.

Lun’Kat attacking the dwarves was probably something of an outlier. Probably also an ideological war, but designed to cause damage to the dwarves, instead of enriching herself. Probably a good example from everyone muttering about ‘that’s not how wars work.’

At the same time, when faced with stiff enough opposition, she did leave the battlefield.

“Moving on. Who can tell me why armies are primarily composed of [Warriors]?” He asked the students.

More confident hands went up, and the professor called on one of them.

“Number?” He asked.

“Three. Solo kills all.” The woman had a particular swagger to her voice. I could imagine her strutting, even though we were all sitting on the ground.

“Ms. 3. Why are armies primarily [Warriors]?” He asked her.

“Because they have staying power.” She promptly replied. “Level for level, stat for stat, quality for quality, a [Mage] is more lethal than a [Warrior] or a [Ranger]. But they run out of mana quickly, on the order of seconds. A [Warrior] can fight for hours on end.”

I snorted. A bad [Mage], sure. There was a reason all Rangers got trained, and were issued armor and weapons.

At the same time, I couldn’t deny that she was right. Most mages were significantly weaker without mana than a warrior of a similar level, and that was before armor and weapon skills were brought into consideration.

The professor nodded.

“Only partially correct. [Warriors] and [Rangers] are capable of fighting for hours, while [Mages] are only strong for a short period of time. A larger, more important aspect is that it’s physical work. Anyone with physical stats can pick up a spear and join a shield wall or picket line, letting armies recruit from the general population. Mages, in contrast, require significantly more time and training as a mage to get to a respectable level where they can make an impact. A mage is equivalent to a career warrior. Han’s generals, Rolland’s knights, Vollomond’s raid leaders, Lithos’s trolls and more are strong examples of career fighters from around the world, all of whom rival a mage in their ability to impact a battlefield. They simply do it over the course of hours, instead of minutes or seconds. Ms. Elaine, in the purple robes, would you be willing to give me a hand for this next section?”

It took me a tenth of a second to realize he was talking to me. The purple robes looked fantastic, but they made me stand out in the sea of black, and I was used to being the picked-on student in classes. I stood up.

“Sure! What are you wondering?”

“I picked you because you’re a healer, and healers are generally a known quantity in what they can do. Unlike, say, a mage, who could have any number of unusual skills. Please, feel free to decline, and I will pick on someone else to share. In broad strokes, would you be willing to tell us roughly how long it would take you, under ideal conditions, to empty your mana pool, and what you could accomplish in that time?”

I weighed his request. On one hand, skills were generally private, and asking someone to reveal their skills to the world was rude. On the other, the professor didn’t seem to give a damn about trampling over feelings, and he was right that healers were a known quantity.

That, and my skills had been on display in the arena, although I didn’t know if anyone here had watched me.

“I’m oathbound. I can empty my entire mana pool in a single second.” I deliberately included the oathbound detail as a misdirection. I’d had time to learn what most healers were like, and broadly, what people thought of oathbound healers.

Harmless do-gooders. I had absolutely no problem leaning into that reputation… and it was the truth!

“A single second. What can you do then?”

I shrugged.

“Keep everyone inside the stadium alive, from heart wounds to decapitation, bringing everyone back to perfect health. Naturally, exactly how many people and how many injuries depends on the number of people and the severity.”

The professor nodded.

“For a single second, the healer is a goddess, literally performing miracles. At the right time, at the right place, she can sway the entire battle her way, healing every single person. But what happens after that second? What happens after her miracle?”

“She dies.” One of the students answered, unprompted.

I loudly snorted. Not likely. I wasn’t going to ruin the professor’s lecture though.

To my surprise though, he gave me a wink.

Oh fuck.

I saw exactly where this was going.

“The healer dies! Exactly! Now, as I mentioned at the start of this class, everyone is shielded by the arena master. Nobody here can get hurt. Elaine, if you would do the honors of demonstrating an empty mana pool?”

He totally knew I was part of the combat team. I was guessing that one of his lessons was something about deception in warfare, since he’d deliberately called me out as a healer - which, on the surface, was entirely reasonable.

Just wished he’d talked to me before. Was probably another layered lesson in always being prepared.

I knelt down and stuck a finger in the dirt, and unleashed [Nova Lance]. The layers of dirt helped hide what, exactly, I was doing, and after 20 seconds my mana pool was depleted.

I then threw up my [Mantle of the Stars] in a sphere around myself, the skill requiring a single point of mana upfront to cast.

With an added bonus - it gave me enough space around myself for what was about to happen. I already saw one or two students - including Ms. 3 - who had realized what was going on.

“Break it to empty my mana pool.” I announced, putting my foot over the glassy hole I’d drilled through the dirt. I subtly bent my knees in preparation for what was going to happen next.

I looked at the professor.

“I can use regenerating mana, right?” I asked him.

He gave me a tiny nod as he started to speak.

“Right! First practical demonstration of the day! Remember, you’re allowed to go all out, nobody here will be harmed! The healer has arrived, and performed a major miracle, revitalizing and saving hundreds! If she escapes, she’ll be able to return soon and do it again! All [Warriors] and [Rangers]! Kill the healer!” He announced, and the world turned to chaos.

I promptly activated the greater invisibility rune in my chest and jumped. I’d known what was coming, and I’d reacted faster than anyone else had.

What was nice about the rune was it took just a hair less mana to run than my current regeneration rate, and I’d gain more and more regeneration as time went on. The cost was fixed, and one day I wouldn’t notice it at all.

I’d reacted fast enough that I needed to take down my own shield so I didn’t slam into it. Nobody had smashed it fast enough.

I soared over the thinnest part of the crowd. As I did, the professor made another announcement.

“Healers, Mages, and non-combatants, if you could please sit down for this demonstration.”

People sitting down were off-limits. Got it.

I landed heavily on the arena grass, the force of my landing making the grass around me ripple. I carefully started to prowl around, trying to find the best place to start my part of the fun.

I heard a few students complain that they hadn’t known, and hadn’t brought a weapon along with them, and it was unfair and how were they supposed to participate.

Idiots.

That was the whole point of the exercise!

A few more people were wondering what was going on, since I’d clearly disappeared. Was the exercise over?

“The healer is still alive and around! What are all of you lollygagging around for!? Stop asking questions and find her!” The professor roared with a smirk.

That got a few students to jump, but I’d already found my quarry. One of the students had a longsword, and was marching around, swishing it through the air.

I took a deep breath. I was putting a lot of faith in Mormerilhawn here.

At the same time, I knew how his shields worked, and what was effective, what would transfer and what a lethal blow was.

I stalked up next to the student, and as he completed a swipe, I chopped down with my arm. I hit the wrist hard enough that it would’ve been broken without the shield, but it was enough to disarm the student. Before he could shout a warning I twisted, using my other hand to punch him in the throat, and he vanished.

The Black Rose’s shield had considered him ‘dead’, and teleported him out of the arena.

Leaving his weapon behind.

I quickly picked it up, my invisibility automatically extending to cover it as well.

The hunt was on.

I was likely stronger and faster than most of the warriors and other physical classers here. I didn’t have skills supporting my weapons. [Sentinel’s Superiority] was about fighting prowess, not hardening weapons.

There was still uncertainty and confusion, but a few Classers were starting to organize the other students. I didn’t have a whole lot of time here.

I dashed forward to the first likely target, another student who was staring at the ground, seeing something I couldn’t. He was intently looking at the path I’d taken though, and while greater invisibility was supposed to erase my footsteps, I wasn’t going to discount a more powerful skill somehow divining tiny traces.

I was unused to longswords and how they handled, but fundamentally ‘stick them with the pointy end’ was true of all weapons. A quick thrust at his chest, and he vanished without anyone noticing.

“Take in this feeling.” The professor lectured as I worked on my next target, my sword flickering out like a spear to teleport him to the sidelines. “The sudden chaos. The fear. The lack of knowing. The violence and confusion. The unexpected. This is a small fraction of what war is like, and the best I can replicate in a classroom setting like this. In the real world, you wouldn’t get a warning. You wouldn’t get a lecture at the same time. Try to grab onto these feelings, and understand a small part of what war is. What you will subject others to. Master yourself.”

I managed to take out three more students during his speech, focusing less on stealth, and more on speed.

I was tempted to force the professor to teleport off the field as well, to really hammer home the lesson he was trying to impart.

Instead I crept around a student who somehow had gotten himself a shield. I paused right before I was going to slice him in half from groin-to-head.

He didn’t exist in my sphere of awareness.

He was an illusion, a mirage. A clever lure by one of the other students.

The rest of the students had, by this point, realized something was up. That I was still here, picking people off, and they were organized and huddled together.

I skipped back a dozen steps and grabbed a pebble.

Time for Brawling’s favorite trick!

I wound up and threw the rock as hard as I could, aiming to brain the star organizer.

I cleanly missed. The rock went sailing over her head.

I mentally grumbled to myself.

I hadn’t fully figured out every last aspect of my new body, and it wasn’t like ‘how to throw rocks’ had ever been in any of my training courses.

“Stop! Halt the exercise!” The professor bellowed. “The healer has successfully escaped, able to come back later and heal dozens of people once again. What have we learned?” He asked the group.

I dropped my invisibility and rejoined the group. I got dirty looks from a number of the students jogging back from the sidelines, where they’d been teleported away. Didn’t care.

Mormerilhawn also came over.

“High level healers are hard to catch.” Ms. 3 said, giving me a look that was hard to interpret.

“That this class is bullshit.” A student muttered under his breath. I could still hear him.

“Level matters.” A familiar student called out. I handed his longsword back to him, getting a small nod of thanks in return.

The professor nodded.

“Another important lesson is not to judge by tags or looks.” The professor said. “Mormerilhawn?”

The arena master stepped up.

“For those of you who pay attention to these sorts of things, Elaine is the star of the School’s under-30 combat team.” He announced. “She is a mage-healer, and yet took out a third of you with her physical capabilities alone. She was on track to successfully eliminate the rest of you, in spite of her stated goal being escape. Deception is the heart of warfare, but do not underestimate the System, and what it empowers all of us to do.”

The professor turned to me.

“Elaine, given your age and level, are you willing to share your numbers with us?”

The request didn’t sting like it would’ve before I started seeing Linnet regularly. I closed my eyes, processing the numbers.

After passing the biomancy hurdle, and having a little more than a year left at the School, I was preparing for my Medical Track thesis. The Medical Manuscripts. I’d be getting endless looks and whispers… might as well start preparing.

Nobody would believe my numbers, but I didn’t care.

“14,878 intelligent beings killed in a team.” I stated. The vast majority of them had been shimagu at Ochi, where I’d let rip. “13,565,516 System kill notifications while working in a team.” I further stated. The end of the Formorian war was responsible for most of those, Destruction’s earthquake combined with the literal hand of a god descending to smite the dread queens.

I opened my eyes to a field of wide eyes and slack jaws.

Comments

Anonymous

T F T C ! War is the perfect class for Elaine to get a gold degree in aside from Healing

M. Lampi

At the beginning of the chapter everyone is wearing exercise outfits instead of robes, but when the instructor calls on Elaine she is wearing purple robes?

Anonymous

Anyone else got the feeling that Ms. 3 is part of the ranger team sent to capture Elaine because of the look she gave her and her comment "High level healers are hard to catch."?

Thomasaurus Rex

I'm confused by what she says at the end about the numbers. Is the 14878 just solo kills? why does them being in a team matter? Are the rest just kills as part of a ranger/sentinel team/army? So the total enemy kills are just both added together?

ARealPerson

Not even the biggest flex in her repertoire. Imagine next time she gets a "Your name is Healer?" comment she responds with the fully accurate "Every healer you've heard of is named after me." There are lie detecting skills right?! Imagine some poor bastard overhearing that and having the option of being unsure if their skill isn't working right, or believing a random stranger is the origin of one of the core pillars of your society. or more likely thinking an insanely skilled liar is present... probably that.

Kalel

All of her kills were while working in a team. She likely makes that qualification because they all know she's oathbound. The rest of your answer is right up there in the text - the smaller number, 14,878, is *intelligent* beings. I.e., sapient beings (humans, elves, etc. - though I suspect most of those are shimagu). The larger number is a more vague 'system kill notifications' which includes non-sapient beings (animals/monsters/etc.).

Anonymous

Or (not that I'd suggest revealing it) "Number of species driven to extinction: 2. Number of intelligent species driven to extinction: 1." Yikes.

Anonymous

everyone in the comments with their neurons activated

matt

I bet she's wearing purple yoga pants. 🤔

matt

Nah, her biggest flex is "I stole from a dragon." Then healing, phoenix companion, then living in the Below Levels for a year.

Melting Sky

Actually, a load of her kills were solo. They sat her up on a tower out ahead of the walls with a backpack full of mana and had her bombard the formian horde with offensive magic to power-level her for weeks on end in preparation for her becoming a Sentinel. The months she spent lost under the mountains also had her killing mass numbers of various creepy crawlies.

Melting Sky

The formians were intelligent. It was only their lowest cast that showed animal levels of intellect. The Queens strategized. She has played a significant role in two successful genocides.

NethanielShade

I am vibrating with anticipation for Friday. Finally, I feel like for the first time since the time skip, I’m actually enjoying the school arc.

Dion Crump

She was part of the army during that time so they count as team kills. Pirates I think are most of her solo kills, that or her time underground after she escaped the dwarves. However her first kill was a solo kill and an intelligent being. She accidentally killed her best friend

TroubleFait

Every dragon isn't as impressive as Lun'kat. Take the little one that got evicted from the School for example.

Hauke Sattler

Another big flex would be, "I got offered several (2) black quality classes offered for my third slot, but declined them because they were not a good fit with my build. Maybe I will take one of them when my main class evolves next." (This would imply that Elaine is near a class up. As a purple robe that would probably mean level 1023.)

Anonymous

While she lived here whole life in a country on the brink of extinction as a military super elite, she don't have many academical knowledge on war. She was trained as a commando, not a commander.

Anonymous

I'm with you on this. I almost unsubscribed. It's getting good now.

matt

Analyze/ identify will give them her exact level though.

Shoto

@Melting Sky ,These are army deaths and have not been counted, Selkie confirmed this on Discord. The 13 million kills were all of Elaine's non-army deaths, most of which were during the Formarian War, where Elaine fought alongside the other Sentinels. For a few days they killed it all together.

matthew gilley

Monsters understand pack tactics. ant are hierarchal creatures, having a high intelligence cast does not correlate to sapience. It does not preclude it either but our non monster ants can adapt, strategize and are currently in a global war with other ant species

Anonymous

What if they already had a team on campus getting some advanced education? Like a promising groupe of futur ranger and asked them to do some reconnaissance

WANDERING LOST

Acually she was trained as a Commander, explicitly so as she was made a sentenial as soon as she left the rangers school.

WANDERING LOST

is it really stealing if it can be considered payment for services rendered and Lun'Kat let her leave?

ikorack

Cliff 2 strong i keep coming back crying tomorrow is too far

AntiClimax she her

I didn't even think of that before your suggestion, but I suppose it's possible. I was thinking more along the lines of her being a mortal, with their taboo against high level healers was enough to explain the look.

Jeanean

I think what MrGaujail meant is that Elaine was trained as a Commander of a small squad, but NOT as a General who commands entire armies.

Cirvante

Most of those are probably from Night, Destruction and Priest Deimos. During the day, the Sentinels killed about one or two formorian soldiers per second. At nighttime, Night just went around their camp like a giant blender for maybe eight hours. He most likely produced the majority of the kills.

Cirvante

The Formorian Queens were intelligent monsters, generally referred to as 'caster types', i.e. monsters that are sapient and get multiple classes. They aren't tagged as their monster types when identified, but rather as their class type. For example, the hydra she fought against with the elves was a [Healer]. Etalix would have been a [Mage] instead of a [Spinosaurus]. The Formorian Soldiers were effectively just drones, produced and controlled by the Queens, using their Forest and Mist classes. They were created at level 159, rather than at level 1 like normal monsters.

Andrew Puterbaugh

Somehow, it had slipped my mind that Elaine had essentially ... Depopulated a city

Anonymous

I always love seeing those sweet sweet Elaine superiority scenes

Nobody

I'm waiting for someone to demand how an oathbound healer got any numbers, let alone those numbers, only to call BS because they've never heard of the 2 species she got most of them from.

Anonymous

to me, those verge on fan service. It's very easy to over do it (I could point to a particular story online but won't).

Anonymous

Yes Jeanean, and even then, she wasn't that good at the squad leader thing

Foxner (edited)

Comment edits

2023-01-02 14:46:25 I loved this chapter Selkie! I was a political science major for three years in college (I now study physics), and one of the areas I focused on was war, its impact on society, and how to repair society after it happens. I think you did a pretty good job of talking about war in this chapter, but I wanted to go into a bit more detail on modern political science theories of why wars happen. So this comment is for those who are interested in learning more. Although technically accurate, Selkie's definition of war leans more toward the question of why and leaves out a well-defined line between what is a war and what isn't. So I'd argue a better definition of war is an event involving the organized use of military force by at least two parties that reach a minimum threshold of severity. The requirement that force is organized rules out spontaneous, disorganized violence, such as large-scale rioting. The requirement that force is used by at least two parties distinguishes war from mass killings perpetrated by a government against some group that does not fight back. The minimum threshold (1,000 battle deaths) excludes cases in which military force is used at low levels, such as brief skirmishes or minor clashes. There are also two major distinctions in the definition of war. Interstate war--a war in which the main participants are states (in political science, the term state can refer to country)--and civil war--a war in which the main participants are within the same state, such as the government and a rebel group. Now onto the reasons for war. A prominent theory in political science is that war is the inevitable result of international anarchy, meaning there is an absence of a central authority capable of policing interstate relations, thus wars can happen because there is nothing to stop states from using force to get their way. On the topic of interstate anarchy, anarchy also creates insecurity and a competition for power, thus, states might fight wars to either increase their own power or to counter the power of others. In political science, this is what we call realism, which emphasizes two primary dynamics that can lead to war. One is a preventive motive, and the other is known as the security dilemma. The security dilemma is a dilemma that arises when efforts that states make to defend themselves cause other states to feel less secure; can lead to arms races and war because of the fear of being attacked. Alternatively to the realism approach, there is a second approach that emphasizes the role of misperception or mistakes. Starting from the observation that the costs of war often far exceed any potential benefits, scholars in this tradition conclude that wars must occur because decision-makers inaccurately estimate their chances of winning or the costs that will have to be paid. Finally, a long tradition of scholarship argues that wars are fought not because they serve the interests of states, but because they serve the interests of influential groups within the state, such as corporations, arms merchants, and the military. In this view, wars are fought in spite of their costs because those costs do not fall on the actors who call the shots. This next section will answer the question, "What do states fight over?" You gotta remember that the purpose of war is not to fight, but to obtain, through fighting or the threat of fighting; so at the root of every war lies a conflict over something that states value. Hence, we should think about the problem of war as a problem of bargaining over objects or issues that are of value to more than one state. The analysis thus starts by assuming that there is an object of value--what we will sometimes refer to as a "good"--and that each state prefers more of the good over less. Wars over territory So, what kinds of goods do states fight over? Well, historically, territory has been the most common source of trouble. Of 155 wars over the last three centuries, 83 of them involved conflict over territory. Why is territory important? First, it might contribute to the wealth of the state (oil, natural gas, or minerals are examples). Iran and Iraq fought a lengthy war, from 1980 to 1988, in part because Iraq coveted Iran's southern oil fields. A second reason that territory can cause conflict between two states is its military or strategic value (an example of this is Golan Heights, on the border between Israel and Syria, which has a commanding position over northern Isreal from which it is possible to launch devastating attacks on the towns below). Finally, a piece of territory might be valuable for ethnic, cultural, or historical reasons (an example of this is the conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors). Wars over state policy Wars can also arise out of conflicts over states' policies. Such conflicts come about when one state enacts a policy that benefits it but harms the interests of another. An example of this is the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, both in 2014 and 2022. Wars over regime types The possibility of using military force to change regimes suggests a third kind of conflict between states: conflicts over regime type, or the composition of another country's government. In its conflict with Ukraine, Russia sought reforms to the Ukrainian political system that would give the Russian minority there greater authority and influence in 2014. Wars over relative power There may be deeper conflicts that give rise to concerns about relative power. The specific conflict that started WW2 was a territorial dispute between Germany and Poland over a small strip of territory that lay between them. However, Britain and France were concerned that a victory over Poland would further strengthen and embolden Germany, making it a more formidable foe in their ongoing struggle for influence and territory in Europe. Bargaining and war Conflicting interests are clearly necessary for wars to happen, but they are not sufficient to explain why wars actually do happen. To understand why some conflicts become wars and others do not, we have to think about the strategic interaction that states engage in when they seek to settle their disputes. Now, normally, in a well-functioning domestic political system, the kinds of disputes that lead to wars are often settled through institutional mechanisms. Property disputes can be resolved by courts backed by effective police powers. If one person engages in actions that harm another; the latter may turn to the legal system to solve the problem. Within states, policy disagreements and conflicting ideas over who should govern can be settled by elections. However, the international system lacks reliable legal, judicial, and electoral institutions. For this reason, states must generally try to settle conflicts with one another through bargaining. States will bargain over the previously mentioned reason for war: territory, and state policy. Although we often think of bargaining as entailing compromise or give-and-take, the bargaining process does not always imply that differences will be split. In many cases, states assume all-or-nothing bargaining positions. A crisis occurs when at least one state seeks to influence the outcome of bargaining by threatening to use military force in the event that it does not get what it wants. At this point, we enter the domain of coercive bargaining, in which the consequences of not reaching an agreement can involve the use of force, including war. We sometimes refer to bargaining under the treat of war as crisis bargaining or coercive diplomacy. In crisis bargaining, the costs and likely outcome of a war determine which deals each side will consider acceptable. We can generally assume that the best possible outcome for a state in crisis is to get the entire good without having to fight. A state would be happy with its preferred outcome (getting the entire good); however, it is quite likely that a state would accept something less than its most preferred settlement. The key statement in what I'm trying to say is, because war is costly, a settlement that all sides prefer over war generally exists. There are models that could be created to determine the most optimal settlement for both sides. This model makes use of what is called the bargaining range: the set of deals that both parties in a bargaining interaction prefer over the reversion outcome. When the reversion outcome is war, the bargaining range is the set of deals that both sides prefer over war. There is more I could go over about the model, but this is already getting a bit long, and I still have quite a bit to cover. War from incomplete information It is possible for a war to happen by mistake. When states have poor and incomplete information about each other's willingness and ability to wage war, two mistakes are possible, both of which can lead to war. First, a state confronted by demand may mistakenly yield too little or not at all. The second is that a state may demand too much under the mistaken belief that the other side will cave in. When states have incomplete information about the capabilities and/or resolve of their opponents, bargaining over goods that they both desire may fail to achieve peaceful settlements. A central dynamic of bargaining under this kind of uncertainty is a phenomenon known as a risk-return trade-off: essentially, there is a trade-off between trying to get a good deal and trying to minimize the possibility that war will break out. (I'm going to speed through this part. If you want to learn more about any of this stuff, let me know.) Incentive to misrepresent and the problem of credibility Given that incomplete information can lead to war, why can't states simply tell each other how capable and resolved they are and thereby avoid war? Actually, a large part of what goes on in a crisis consists precisely of such efforts to communication. Actually, a large part of what goes on in a crisis consists precisely of such efforts at communication. Crises are generally characterized by diplomatic exchanges, threats and counter-threats, mobilization of forces, movement of troops, and positioning of weaponry. These actions, inpart, have a military purpose: one cannot wage war, after all, without first mobilizing the necessary forces and putting them in place. But these actions also have a political purpose: they are the language of coercive diplomacy, the vocabulary that states use to convince one another that they are willing to back their bargaining positions with the threat of force. However, a crucial question arises in crisis bargain of whether the messages a state sends have credibility. A credible threat is a threat the target believes will be carried out. On the contrary, we say that a threat lacks credibility if its target has reason to doubt that the threat will be carried out. Why Is credibility hard to achieve? There are two interrelated reasons. First, carrying through on threats is costly. A state may say that it will wage war if its demands are nor met, but the costs of war might be such that it would not make sense to fulfill this threat if called on to do so (a good example is the Cold War). The second reason stems from the conflicting interests at the heart of the bargaining interaction. Even though states have a common interest in avoiding war, each also wants the best possible deal for itself, so they have incentives to hide or misrepresent their information. To send credible signals One way to send credible signals is to do what is called Brinksmanship, which refers to a strategy that arose in the nuclear age. It is a strategy in which adversaries take actions that increase the risk of accidental war, with the hope that the other will "blink" (lose its nerve) first and make concessions. Basically, both sides get to the "brink" of war through proactive actions until one side gives up. A second way in which states can send credible signals of their willingness to fight is by making threats in ways that would make backing down difficult. This is called Trying Hands. A final mechanism states use to signal their resolve in a crisis involves taking costly steps to increase their capabilities, such as by mobilizing and deploying a large military force, increasing military manpower, and/or spending large sums of money. This is called Paying for Power. War from commitment problems The causes of war considered here all arise from a common underlying challenge: the difficulty that states can have making credible promises not to use force to rerevise the settlement at a later date. An example of such a problem is the Prisoner's Dilemma; however, I won't get into that unless you ask. Bargaining over goods that are a source of future bargaining power The clearest place to see the role of commitment problems is in disputes over goods that can serve as a source of future bargaining power. Examples are strategically important pieces of territory and weapons programs. War in response to changing power A second, related problem arises if the balance of military capabilities is anticipated to change because of factors external to the bargaining process. An example is different rates of economic growth. War in response to fear of attack A final commitment problem that can prevent states from reaching negotiated settlements of their disputes arises from fear of attack by an opponent with a first strike advantage. Example: a nuke. War from indivisibility Finally, the third kind of problem that can prevent states from reaching mutually beneficial settlements of their disputes because the disputed good can not be divided. A good is divisible if there are ways to split it into smaller shares; an indivisible good cannot be divided without destroying its value. Here is an easy-to-understand example, imagine the difference between having 100 pennies and having one dollar bill. Although the amount of money available is the same in both cases, the pennies can be divided up between two people in many different ways, while the dollar bill cannot be split without ruining it. A commonly cited example of an indivisible good in international relations is the city of Jerusalem. It is a city that contains some of the holiest cites of Christianity, Islam, Judaism and has historical, cultural, and religious significance unlike any other piece of territory in the world. Citation Frieden, J. A., Lake, D. A., & Schultz, K. A. (n.d.). World Politics: Interests, Interactions, Institutions (Fourth Edition). Retrieved from https://platform.virdocs.com/r/s/0/doc/596369/sp/176361598/mi/565497145?cfi=%2F4%2F4 END Ok, I may perhaps have gotten a bit carried away with writing about political science and quickly veered away from comparing what Selkie wrote with what I have learned in university. I'll likely post this in the comment section in Royal Road, too, when the chapter comes out, but if yall want to get any more detail/clarification from me, lmk. Do avoid copying what I wrote since this is highly plagiarised from one of my old textbooks. I would have normally not done that, but the alternative was to spend even more time writing what was essentially my final for the international politics class I took. Anyways, I hope yall learned something from this comment.
2023-01-02 06:19:44 I loved this chapter Selkie! I was a political science major for three years in college (I now study physics), and one of the areas I focused on was war, its impact on society, and how to repair society after it happens. I think you did a pretty good job of talking about war in this chapter, but I wanted to go into a bit more detail on modern political science theories of why wars happen. So this comment is for those who are interested in learning more. Although technically accurate, Selkie's definition of war leans more toward the question of why and leaves out a well-defined line between what is a war and what isn't. So I'd argue a better definition of war is an event involving the organized use of military force by at least two parties that reach a minimum threshold of severity. The requirement that force is organized rules out spontaneous, disorganized violence, such as large-scale rioting. The requirement that force is used by at least two parties distinguishes war from mass killings perpetrated by a government against some group that does not fight back. The minimum threshold (1,000 battle deaths) excludes cases in which military force is used at low levels, such as brief skirmishes or minor clashes. There are also two major distinctions in the definition of war. Interstate war--a war in which the main participants are states (in political science, the term state can refer to country)--and civil war--a war in which the main participants are within the same state, such as the government and a rebel group. Now onto the reasons for war. A prominent theory in political science is that war is the inevitable result of international anarchy, meaning there is an absence of a central authority capable of policing interstate relations, thus wars can happen because there is nothing to stop states from using force to get their way. On the topic of interstate anarchy, anarchy also creates insecurity and a competition for power, thus, states might fight wars to either increase their own power or to counter the power of others. In political science, this is what we call realism, which emphasizes two primary dynamics that can lead to war. One is a preventive motive, and the other is known as the security dilemma. The security dilemma is a dilemma that arises when efforts that states make to defend themselves cause other states to feel less secure; can lead to arms races and war because of the fear of being attacked. Alternatively to the realism approach, there is a second approach that emphasizes the role of misperception or mistakes. Starting from the observation that the costs of war often far exceed any potential benefits, scholars in this tradition conclude that wars must occur because decision-makers inaccurately estimate their chances of winning or the costs that will have to be paid. Finally, a long tradition of scholarship argues that wars are fought not because they serve the interests of states, but because they serve the interests of influential groups within the state, such as corporations, arms merchants, and the military. In this view, wars are fought in spite of their costs because those costs do not fall on the actors who call the shots. This next section will answer the question, "What do states fight over?" You gotta remember that the purpose of war is not to fight, but to obtain, through fighting or the threat of fighting; so at the root of every war lies a conflict over something that states value. Hence, we should think about the problem of war as a problem of bargaining over objects or issues that are of value to more than one state. The analysis thus starts by assuming that there is an object of value--what we will sometimes refer to as a "good"--and that each state prefers more of the good over less. Wars over territory So, what kinds of goods do states fight over? Well, historically, territory has been the most common source of trouble. Of 155 wars over the last three centuries, 83 of them involved conflict over territory. Why is territory important? First, it might contribute to the wealth of the state (oil, natural gas, or minerals are examples). Iran and Iraq fought a lengthy war, from 1980 to 1988, in part because Iraq coveted Iran's southern oil fields. A second reason that territory can cause conflict between two states is its military or strategic value (an example of this is Golan Heights, on the border between Israel and Syria, which has a commanding position over northern Isreal from which it is possible to launch devastating attacks on the towns below). Finally, a piece of territory might be valuable for ethnic, cultural, or historical reasons (an example of this is the conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors). Wars over state policy Wars can also arise out of conflicts over states' policies. Such conflicts come about when one state enacts a policy that benefits it but harms the interests of another. An example of this is the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, both in 2014 and 2022. Wars over regime types The possibility of using military force to change regimes suggests a third kind of conflict between states: conflicts over regime type, or the composition of another country's government. In its conflict with Ukraine, Russia sought reforms to the Ukrainian political system that would give the Russian minority there greater authority and influence in 2014. Wars over relative power There may be deeper conflicts that give rise to concerns about relative power. The specific conflict that started WW2 was a territorial dispute between Germany and Poland over a small strip of territory that lay between them. However, Britain and France were concerned that a victory over Poland would further strengthen and embolden Germany, making it a more formidable foe in their ongoing struggle for influence and territory in Europe. Bargaining and war Conflicting interests are clearly necessary for wars to happen, but they are not sufficient to explain why wars actually do happen. To understand why some conflicts become wars and others do not, we have to think about the strategic interaction that states engage in when they seek to settle their disputes. Now, normally, in a well-functioning domestic political system, the kinds of disputes that lead to wars are often settled through institutional mechanisms. Property disputes can be resolved by courts backed by effective police powers. If one person engages in actions that harm another; the latter may turn to the legal system to solve the problem. Within states, policy disagreements and conflicting ideas over who should govern can be settled by elections. However, the international system lacks reliable legal, judicial, and electoral institutions. For this reason, states must generally try to settle conflicts with one another through bargaining. States will bargain over the previously mentioned reason for war: territory, and state policy. Although we often think of bargaining as entailing compromise or give-and-take, the bargaining process does not always imply that differences will be split. In many cases, states assume all-or-nothing bargaining positions. A crisis occurs when at least one state seeks to influence the outcome of bargaining by threatening to use military force in the event that it does not get what it wants. At this point, we enter the domain of coercive bargaining, in which the consequences of not reaching an agreement can involve the use of force, including war. We sometimes refer to bargaining under the treat of war as crisis bargaining or coercive diplomacy. In crisis bargaining, the costs and likely outcome of a war determine which deals each side will consider acceptable. We can generally assume that the best possible outcome for a state in crisis is to get the entire good without having to fight. A state would be happy with its preferred outcome (getting the entire good); however, it is quite likely that a state would accept something less than its most preferred settlement. The key statement in what I'm trying to say is, because war is costly, a settlement that all sides prefer over war generally exists. There are models that could be created to determine the most optimal settlement for both sides. This model makes use of what is called the bargaining range: the set of deals that both parties in a bargaining interaction prefer over the reversion outcome. When the reversion outcome is war, the bargaining range is the set of deals that both sides prefer over war. There is more I could go over about the model, but this is already getting a bit long, and I still have quite a bit to cover. War from incomplete information It is possible for a war to happen by mistake. When states have poor and incomplete information about each other's willingness and ability to wage war, two mistakes are possible, both of which can lead to war. First, a state confronted by demand may mistakenly yield too little or not at all. The second is that a state may demand too much under the mistaken belief that the other side will cave in. When states have incomplete information about the capabilities and/or resolve of their opponents, bargaining over goods that they both desire may fail to achieve peaceful settlements. A central dynamic of bargaining under this kind of uncertainty is a phenomenon known as a risk-return trade-off: essentially, there is a trade-off between trying to get a good deal and trying to minimize the possibility that war will break out. (I'm going to speed through this part. If you want to learn more about any of this stuff, let me know.) Incentive to misrepresent and the problem of credibility Given that incomplete information can lead to war, why can't states simply tell each other how capable and resolved they are and thereby avoid war? Actually, a large part of what goes on in a crisis consists precisely of such efforts to communication. Actually, a large part of what goes on in a crisis consists precisely of such efforts at communication. Crises are generally characterized by diplomatic exchanges, threats and counter-threats, mobilization of forces, movement of troops, and positioning of weaponry. These actions, inpart, have a military purpose: one cannot wage war, after all, without first mobilizing the necessary forces and putting them in place. But these actions also have a political purpose: they are the language of coercive diplomacy, the vocabulary that states use to convince one another that they are willing to back their bargaining positions with the threat of force. However, a crucial question arises in crisis bargain of whether the messages a state sends have credibility. A credible threat is a threat the target believes will be carried out. On the contrary, we say that a threat lacks credibility if its target has reason to doubt that the threat will be carried out. Why Is credibility hard to achieve? There are two interrelated reasons. First, carrying through on threats is costly. A state may say that it will wage war if its demands are nor met, but the costs of war might be such that it would not make sense to fulfill this threat if called on to do so (a good example is the Cold War). The second reason stems from the conflicting interests at the heart of the bargaining interaction. Even though states have a common interest in avoiding war, each also wants the best possible deal for itself, so they have incentives to hide or misrepresent their information. To send credible signals One way to send credible signals is to do what is called Brinksmanship, which refers to a strategy that arose in the nuclear age. It is a strategy in which adversaries take actions that increase the risk of accidental war, with the hope that the other will "blink" (lose its nerve) first and make concessions. Basically, both sides get to the "brink" of war through proactive actions until one side gives up. A second way in which states can send credible signals of their willingness to fight is by making threats in ways that would make backing down difficult. This is called Trying Hands. A final mechanism states use to signal their resolve in a crisis involves taking costly steps to increase their capabilities, such as by mobilizing and deploying a large military force, increasing military manpower, and/or spending large sums of money. This is called Paying for Power. War from commitment problems The causes of war considered here all arise from a common underlying challenge: the difficulty that states can have making credible promises not to use force to rerevise the settlement at a later date. An example of such a problem is the Prisoner's Dilemma; however, I won't get into that unless you ask. Bargaining over goods that are a source of future bargaining power The clearest place to see the role of commitment problems is in disputes over goods that can serve as a source of future bargaining power. Examples are strategically important pieces of territory and weapons programs. War in response to changing power A second, related problem arises if the balance of military capabilities is anticipated to change because of factors external to the bargaining process. An example is different rates of economic growth. War in response to fear of attack A final commitment problem that can prevent states from reaching negotiated settlements of their disputes arises from fear of attack by an opponent with a first strike advantage. Example: a nuke. War from indivisibility Finally, the third kind of problem that can prevent states from reaching mutually beneficial settlements of their disputes because the disputed good can not be divided. A good is divisible if there are ways to split it into smaller shares; an indivisible good cannot be divided without destroying its value. Here is an easy-to-understand example, imagine the difference between having 100 pennies and having one dollar bill. Although the amount of money available is the same in both cases, the pennies can be divided up between two people in many different ways, while the dollar bill cannot be split without ruining it. A commonly cited example of an indivisible good in international relations is the city of Jerusalem. It is a city that contains some of the holiest cites of Christianity, Islam, Judaism and has historical, cultural, and religious significance unlike any other piece of territory in the world. Citation Frieden, J. A., Lake, D. A., & Schultz, K. A. (n.d.). World Politics: Interests, Interactions, Institutions (Fourth Edition). Retrieved from https://platform.virdocs.com/r/s/0/doc/596369/sp/176361598/mi/565497145?cfi=%2F4%2F4 END Ok, I may perhaps have gotten a bit carried away with writing about political science and quickly veered away from comparing what Selkie wrote with what I have learned in university. I'll likely post this in the comment section in Royal Road, too, when the chapter comes out, but if yall want to get any more detail/clarification from me, lmk. Do avoid copying what I wrote since this is highly plagiarised from one of my old textbooks. I would have normally not done that, but the alternative was to spend even more time writing what was essentially my final for the international politics class I took. Anyways, I hope yall learned something from this comment.

I loved this chapter Selkie! I was a political science major for three years in college (I now study physics), and one of the areas I focused on was war, its impact on society, and how to repair society after it happens. I think you did a pretty good job of talking about war in this chapter, but I wanted to go into a bit more detail on modern political science theories of why wars happen. So this comment is for those who are interested in learning more. Although technically accurate, Selkie's definition of war leans more toward the question of why and leaves out a well-defined line between what is a war and what isn't. So I'd argue a better definition of war is an event involving the organized use of military force by at least two parties that reach a minimum threshold of severity. The requirement that force is organized rules out spontaneous, disorganized violence, such as large-scale rioting. The requirement that force is used by at least two parties distinguishes war from mass killings perpetrated by a government against some group that does not fight back. The minimum threshold (1,000 battle deaths) excludes cases in which military force is used at low levels, such as brief skirmishes or minor clashes. There are also two major distinctions in the definition of war. Interstate war--a war in which the main participants are states (in political science, the term state can refer to country)--and civil war--a war in which the main participants are within the same state, such as the government and a rebel group. Now onto the reasons for war. A prominent theory in political science is that war is the inevitable result of international anarchy, meaning there is an absence of a central authority capable of policing interstate relations, thus wars can happen because there is nothing to stop states from using force to get their way. On the topic of interstate anarchy, anarchy also creates insecurity and a competition for power, thus, states might fight wars to either increase their own power or to counter the power of others. In political science, this is what we call realism, which emphasizes two primary dynamics that can lead to war. One is a preventive motive, and the other is known as the security dilemma. The security dilemma is a dilemma that arises when efforts that states make to defend themselves cause other states to feel less secure; can lead to arms races and war because of the fear of being attacked. Alternatively to the realism approach, there is a second approach that emphasizes the role of misperception or mistakes. Starting from the observation that the costs of war often far exceed any potential benefits, scholars in this tradition conclude that wars must occur because decision-makers inaccurately estimate their chances of winning or the costs that will have to be paid. Finally, a long tradition of scholarship argues that wars are fought not because they serve the interests of states, but because they serve the interests of influential groups within the state, such as corporations, arms merchants, and the military. In this view, wars are fought in spite of their costs because those costs do not fall on the actors who call the shots. This next section will answer the question, "What do states fight over?" You gotta remember that the purpose of war is not to fight, but to obtain, through fighting or the threat of fighting; so at the root of every war lies a conflict over something that states value. Hence, we should think about the problem of war as a problem of bargaining over objects or issues that are of value to more than one state. The analysis thus starts by assuming that there is an object of value--what we will sometimes refer to as a "good"--and that each state prefers more of the good over less. Wars over territory So, what kinds of goods do states fight over? Well, historically, territory has been the most common source of trouble. Of 155 wars over the last three centuries, 83 of them involved conflict over territory. Why is territory important? First, it might contribute to the wealth of the state (oil, natural gas, or minerals are examples). Iran and Iraq fought a lengthy war, from 1980 to 1988, in part because Iraq coveted Iran's southern oil fields. A second reason that territory can cause conflict between two states is its military or strategic value (an example of this is Golan Heights, on the border between Israel and Syria, which has a commanding position over northern Isreal from which it is possible to launch devastating attacks on the towns below). Finally, a piece of territory might be valuable for ethnic, cultural, or historical reasons (an example of this is the conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors). Wars over state policy Wars can also arise out of conflicts over states' policies. Such conflicts come about when one state enacts a policy that benefits it but harms the interests of another. An example of this is the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, both in 2014 and 2022. Wars over regime types The possibility of using military force to change regimes suggests a third kind of conflict between states: conflicts over regime type, or the composition of another country's government. In its conflict with Ukraine, Russia sought reforms to the Ukrainian political system that would give the Russian minority there greater authority and influence in 2014. Wars over relative power There may be deeper conflicts that give rise to concerns about relative power. The specific conflict that started WW2 was a territorial dispute between Germany and Poland over a small strip of territory that lay between them. However, Britain and France were concerned that a victory over Poland would further strengthen and embolden Germany, making it a more formidable foe in their ongoing struggle for influence and territory in Europe. Bargaining and war Conflicting interests are clearly necessary for wars to happen, but they are not sufficient to explain why wars actually do happen. To understand why some conflicts become wars and others do not, we have to think about the strategic interaction that states engage in when they seek to settle their disputes. Now, normally, in a well-functioning domestic political system, the kinds of disputes that lead to wars are often settled through institutional mechanisms. Property disputes can be resolved by courts backed by effective police powers. If one person engages in actions that harm another; the latter may turn to the legal system to solve the problem. Within states, policy disagreements and conflicting ideas over who should govern can be settled by elections. However, the international system lacks reliable legal, judicial, and electoral institutions. For this reason, states must generally try to settle conflicts with one another through bargaining. States will bargain over the previously mentioned reason for war: territory, and state policy. Although we often think of bargaining as entailing compromise or give-and-take, the bargaining process does not always imply that differences will be split. In many cases, states assume all-or-nothing bargaining positions. A crisis occurs when at least one state seeks to influence the outcome of bargaining by threatening to use military force in the event that it does not get what it wants. At this point, we enter the domain of coercive bargaining, in which the consequences of not reaching an agreement can involve the use of force, including war. We sometimes refer to bargaining under the treat of war as crisis bargaining or coercive diplomacy. In crisis bargaining, the costs and likely outcome of a war determine which deals each side will consider acceptable. We can generally assume that the best possible outcome for a state in crisis is to get the entire good without having to fight. A state would be happy with its preferred outcome (getting the entire good); however, it is quite likely that a state would accept something less than its most preferred settlement. The key statement in what I'm trying to say is, because war is costly, a settlement that all sides prefer over war generally exists. There are models that could be created to determine the most optimal settlement for both sides. This model makes use of what is called the bargaining range: the set of deals that both parties in a bargaining interaction prefer over the reversion outcome. When the reversion outcome is war, the bargaining range is the set of deals that both sides prefer over war. There is more I could go over about the model, but this is already getting a bit long, and I still have quite a bit to cover. War from incomplete information It is possible for a war to happen by mistake. When states have poor and incomplete information about each other's willingness and ability to wage war, two mistakes are possible, both of which can lead to war. First, a state confronted by demand may mistakenly yield too little or not at all. The second is that a state may demand too much under the mistaken belief that the other side will cave in. When states have incomplete information about the capabilities and/or resolve of their opponents, bargaining over goods that they both desire may fail to achieve peaceful settlements. A central dynamic of bargaining under this kind of uncertainty is a phenomenon known as a risk-return trade-off: essentially, there is a trade-off between trying to get a good deal and trying to minimize the possibility that war will break out. (I'm going to speed through this part. If you want to learn more about any of this stuff, let me know.) Incentive to misrepresent and the problem of credibility Given that incomplete information can lead to war, why can't states simply tell each other how capable and resolved they are and thereby avoid war? Actually, a large part of what goes on in a crisis consists precisely of such efforts to communication. Actually, a large part of what goes on in a crisis consists precisely of such efforts at communication. Crises are generally characterized by diplomatic exchanges, threats and counter-threats, mobilization of forces, movement of troops, and positioning of weaponry. These actions, inpart, have a military purpose: one cannot wage war, after all, without first mobilizing the necessary forces and putting them in place. But these actions also have a political purpose: they are the language of coercive diplomacy, the vocabulary that states use to convince one another that they are willing to back their bargaining positions with the threat of force. However, a crucial question arises in crisis bargain of whether the messages a state sends have credibility. A credible threat is a threat the target believes will be carried out. On the contrary, we say that a threat lacks credibility if its target has reason to doubt that the threat will be carried out. Why Is credibility hard to achieve? There are two interrelated reasons. First, carrying through on threats is costly. A state may say that it will wage war if its demands are nor met, but the costs of war might be such that it would not make sense to fulfill this threat if called on to do so (a good example is the Cold War). The second reason stems from the conflicting interests at the heart of the bargaining interaction. Even though states have a common interest in avoiding war, each also wants the best possible deal for itself, so they have incentives to hide or misrepresent their information. To send credible signals One way to send credible signals is to do what is called Brinksmanship, which refers to a strategy that arose in the nuclear age. It is a strategy in which adversaries take actions that increase the risk of accidental war, with the hope that the other will "blink" (lose its nerve) first and make concessions. Basically, both sides get to the "brink" of war through proactive actions until one side gives up. A second way in which states can send credible signals of their willingness to fight is by making threats in ways that would make backing down difficult. This is called Trying Hands. A final mechanism states use to signal their resolve in a crisis involves taking costly steps to increase their capabilities, such as by mobilizing and deploying a large military force, increasing military manpower, and/or spending large sums of money. This is called Paying for Power. War from commitment problems The causes of war considered here all arise from a common underlying challenge: the difficulty that states can have making credible promises not to use force to rerevise the settlement at a later date. An example of such a problem is the Prisoner's Dilemma; however, I won't get into that unless you ask. Bargaining over goods that are a source of future bargaining power The clearest place to see the role of commitment problems is in disputes over goods that can serve as a source of future bargaining power. Examples are strategically important pieces of territory and weapons programs. War in response to changing power A second, related problem arises if the balance of military capabilities is anticipated to change because of factors external to the bargaining process. An example is different rates of economic growth. War in response to fear of attack A final commitment problem that can prevent states from reaching negotiated settlements of their disputes arises from fear of attack by an opponent with a first strike advantage. Example: a nuke. War from indivisibility Finally, the third kind of problem that can prevent states from reaching mutually beneficial settlements of their disputes because the disputed good can not be divided. A good is divisible if there are ways to split it into smaller shares; an indivisible good cannot be divided without destroying its value. Here is an easy-to-understand example, imagine the difference between having 100 pennies and having one dollar bill. Although the amount of money available is the same in both cases, the pennies can be divided up between two people in many different ways, while the dollar bill cannot be split without ruining it. A commonly cited example of an indivisible good in international relations is the city of Jerusalem. It is a city that contains some of the holiest cites of Christianity, Islam, Judaism and has historical, cultural, and religious significance unlike any other piece of territory in the world. Citation Frieden, J. A., Lake, D. A., & Schultz, K. A. (n.d.). World Politics: Interests, Interactions, Institutions (Fourth Edition). Retrieved from https://platform.virdocs.com/r/s/0/doc/596369/sp/176361598/mi/565497145?cfi=%2F4%2F4 END Ok, I may perhaps have gotten a bit carried away with writing about political science and quickly veered away from comparing what Selkie wrote with what I have learned in university. I'll likely post this in the comment section in Royal Road, too, when the chapter comes out, but if yall want to get any more detail/clarification from me, lmk. Do avoid copying what I wrote since this is highly plagiarised from one of my old textbooks. I would have normally not done that, but the alternative was to spend even more time writing what was essentially my final for the international politics class I took. Anyways, I hope yall learned something from this comment.