Home Artists Posts Import Register

Content

Exports and imports can sometimes be exaggerated due to two major factors: the omission of value-added parts in manufacturing chains and profit shifting as a corporate strategy to avoid taxes. In the global manufacturing process, products often involve components and parts sourced from various countries, such as chips in iPhones and other electronics.

However, when calculating trade figures, only the final value of the product is typically considered. This means that the value-added contributions from different countries along the supply chain are not accurately reflected. Imports from China have significantly increased over the past three decades, often as a result of displacing imports from other U.S. trading partners.

For example, if a product is assembled in China but contains components manufactured in the US, the full value of those US components may not be accounted for in China's export figures. We can refer to the 2017 Bloomberg article titled "Suddenly, America's Trade Deficit Isn't So Awful" (https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-12-22/suddenly-america-s-trade-deficit-isn-t-so-awful), as well as a report therein about tax reform by Goldman Sachs.

Second, multinational corporations often strategically shift profits to countries with lower tax rates to reduce their tax liabilities. By establishing subsidiaries or engaging in transfer pricing practices, companies can allocate profits to jurisdictions with more favorable tax regimes. This can lead to a discrepancy between where the economic activity takes place and where the profits are reported. In the context of trade deficits, this profit shifting can distort the numbers by inflating the value of imports from low-tax countries and reducing the reported value of exports.

For instance, if a US company shifts profits to a low-tax jurisdiction like Ireland, it can artificially inflate the US trade deficit with Ireland. The US actually benefits from China’s investment in its economy, illustrating the double-edged sword of trade deficits—flowing trade surplus back to the US in the form of investment. In export-driven economies, central banks often prefer to hold their reserves in dollar assets, particularly in treasury bonds, due to financial and political considerations.

This preference arises from the absence of a better alternative. It helps keep U.S. interest rates down under normal circumstances, reducing mortgage payments for millions of U.S. households while saving the federal government tens of billions of dollars a year in interest payments. While this grants Americans the privilege of accessing cheap borrowing to purchase fixed assets such as houses, which are often considered unaffordable, it also poses a significant financial risk similar to the credit crunch experienced during the 2008 financial crisis.

Therefore, it imposes a significant burden on working-class Americans who are adversely affected by trade imbalances. Trade imbalances between the US and China have benefited the rich and powerful on both sides. In the US, the wealthy have profited from rising stock and real estate values fueled by cheap money, while in China, the well-connected corporate elites have gained from increased resource allocation. It may be more of a wishful thinking to believe that economic redistribution in the US could alleviate some of the harm caused by imbalances.

However, other countries are unlikely to be deterred from buying dollar assets due to the rule of flight-to-safety. Beijing’s intention is undoubtedly to strengthen and advance its manufacturing base, shifting from low-skill to high-end products, and increasing its national power in technology and other countries’ reliance on its manufacturing chains. Therefore, its ambition through persistent trade surpluses is not solely driven by the interests of well-connected industrialists, but could also serve as part of a broader grand strategy aimed at outmatching the US in a geopolitical struggle.

Political considerations must be taken into account, and we should look at the issues beyond the domain of trade imbalances, especially when dealing with an authoritarian regime. Otherwise, we risk failing to see the bigger but crucial picture. It is as if we are studying the rationale behind Beijing's approval of letting Tesla build a super factory in Shanghai with numerous incentives solely through the lens of the business benefits for both sides derived from the deal, without considering the vision of an ambitious dictator.

The above points are just a display of the complex interplay between economic forces, class interests, and geopolitical considerations in shaping trade imbalances, particularly between the US and China. They highlight the need for a deeper understanding of their dynamics and their consequences on both sides. While some factors can impact the accuracy of trade figures, they do not negate the existence of trade imbalances between countries. However, understanding these complexities provides a more nuanced perspective on the true nature of trade relationships.

▶️ 蕭少滔:特朗普2.0:看不見中美貿易戰的好處,這是因為你太悲觀https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DgQeSCO8J_8

Files

Comments

charles oreo

There are some misleading points from the article 1. Re “For example, if a product is assembled in China but contains components manufactured in the US, the full value of those US components may not be accounted for in China's export figures.” —actually the fully value of exports will reflect the us components, but will be netted from the imports from the US(eg來料加工, 中國只賺取加工費). the trade number we have talking should be net of exports and imports between the two countries, which for long period , China is accumulating huge trade surplus vs US since China joined WTO in 2001. 2. Re “if a US company shifts profits to a low-tax jurisdiction like Ireland, it can artificially inflate the US trade deficit with Ireland. The US actually benefits from China’s investment in its economy, …..” it seems the writer mixed money flow under current account vs capital account. The trade surplus or deficit are mainly from the goods or services under current account, while the items as investments, overseas revenue moving cross the border are usually related to FDI which is under capital account. eg , Apple’s overseas revenue, will be counted as part of US exports’ income. It will not be inflated. If apple selected not to repatriate the income back to US for tax or other reasons, which will be reinvested, it will become part of FDI (foreign direct investment) into Ireland, which is within FDI (or capital account category) not trade item under current account category. from FDI’ s perspective, it will become the asset of US and liability to Ireland(not trade deficit). 3. Whether China is doing good by holding huge dollar assets, not for its good intention but because it is complicated consequence of “China distorted economy and capital control which not allowing currency free trade and conversion” .中國是個資本管制的國家,過去20多年中國享受了巨大的貿易順差, 國外的直接投資(fdi), 這些外幣收入成為中國官方儲備的巨大來源(當然現在趨勢反轉)。中國持有巨量美債,客觀上幫助了美國政府解決財政赤字,但是美國市場的利率水平根本上不取決於國外投資人的持有,(中國官方只持有美債的1/10, 最大的美債持有人是boj 和美國本土投資人),而是取決於自身的通脹和經濟狀況。美債有它的privilege, not was granted, but because of its superior strength in the world. 4. Re, “Beijing’s intention is undoubtedly to strengthen and advance its manufacturing base, shifting from low-skill to high-end products, and increasing its national power in technology and other countries’ reliance on its manufacturing chains. Therefore, its ambition through persistent trade surpluses is not solely driven by the interests of well-connected industrialists, but could also serve as part of a broader grand strategy aimed at outmatching the US in a geopolitical struggle.”… 無非新瓶裝舊酒,是否可以維繫長久的trader surplus 僅靠經常項下的產品結構改變不可能做到了,加上新增流入中國的FDI 已經沒有了,歷年累積下來的fdi 和盈餘又以資本外流的方式迅速流出,除了自己畫餅充飢看不出“great vision of dictator”

George

Thank you for sharing your perspective. I value your input and would like to respond to your points with the following clarification. (1) The piece highlights the impact of "double counting" on exports and imports, rather than on the net trade figures. This’s because double counting—the value of imported components and the value-added through the manufacturing process—is often asymmetric, that is, it’s not a zero-sum game. This asymmetry becomes more pronounced in high-end products like iPhones and other luxury goods, influenced by factors such as branding, market demand, and product popularity. While it’s true that China has accumulated a large trade surplus with the US, the final value of products may not be accurately reflected in the amount of money China is able to gain from its exports when a large portion of the value-added is often captured by foreign companies. The actual amount going into the pocket of foreign reserves is derived largely from the mass production of low-end and inexpensive goods (quantities), rather than high-end and costly goods of foreign brands (quality). Yet a nation's economy is not as simple as this simplistic view suggests. Local companies play a crucial role in various stages of the production process, encompassing manufacturing, assembly, and supply chain activities. These involvements that aren’t reflected in the trade balance contributes to economic growth in China, benefiting domestic consumption and employment opportunities and thus boosting its GDP. Nevertheless, the Chinese government is actively working to reverse this trend by focusing on the export of their own high-tech products, aiming to take a large chunk of the value-added in its exports. (2) Profit shifting is a common practice among multinational corporations with the goal of reducing their overall tax liability. In addition to its tax implications, profit shifting can give rise to the trade deficit of a country where a company is headquartered, as exemplified by Apple's tax dispute in the EU. The piece doesn’t address the topic of profit repatriation or reinvestment in other countries. This falls under the realm of international finance which is beyond the scope of the original discussion. The practice of profit shifting can also inflate the trade deficit between two countries. Let's take Apple as an illustrative example for the case of the US and China. Apple designs, manufactures, and sells a wide range of electronic devices, including iPhones, iPads, and Mac computers worldwide. A significant portion of Apple's products are manufactured in China, where Apple has a large network of suppliers and manufacturing facilities. To minimize its tax liability, Apple engages in profit shifting by transferring a portion of its profits from China to the US. This is achieved through various mechanisms, such as transfer pricing, where Apple sets artificially low prices for products sold to its Chinese subsidiaries and high prices for products purchased from them. As a result of profit shifting, Apple's reported profits in China are lower than they would be. This, in turn, leads to a lower reported trade surplus for China and a higher reported trade deficit for the US. It’s worth mentioning that profit shifting might move profits around on paper and twist statistical figures, but it doesn't change the physical flow of goods. In reality, profit shifting is often carried out through an intricate web of subsidiaries and low-tax jurisdictions to reduce the overall tax burden. The preceding discussion primarily addresses the trade balance and doesn’t explore the matters related to the capital account. Rather than discussing profit shifting in the context of international trade and finance, the piece aims to emphasize a key message that the generation of higher reserves by China through its trade surplus with the US often leads to increased investments in the US. Focusing solely on the figures within the current account while disregarding the capital inflows in the capital account can lead to a biased assessment. (3) China's preference for holding USD assets is largely due to the lack of a better alternative (eg. flight to safety), as already mentioned in the piece. The piece doesn’t cast any doubt on the supremacy of US government bonds. The Federal Reserve controls interest rates through its monetary policy and the open market operations. One of the tools often used by the Fed is to set the level of the federal fund rate which is a benchmark for short-term interest rates. In addition, the Fed can conduct open market operations (OMOs) by buying or selling U.S. government securities in the open market to control both short-term and long-term interest rates. However, long rates are largely influenced by 30-year treasury yield, so they depend on the supply and demand of international bond markets, rather than the appetite of a single participant due to the enormous market size. It’s not entirely accurate to say that the Fed has complete control over long rates although it does have some influence over them through various tools such as OMOs and forward guidance. (4) It appears that the points in the piece do not necessarily contradict your perspective. Nor do they suggest the possible success of the CCP’s ambitious plan. They serve more of expressing vigilance over the CCP’s “grand strategy” and highlighting the risks associated with it.